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A STUDY ON RULE 145 OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 
1933: HOW TO PROVIDE CLARITY AND 
PREDICTABILITY IN RULE 145 TRANSACTIONS 
Kab Lae Kim* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Under the Securities Act of 1933 (hereinafter the 1933 Act),1 an 
issuer must register or be eligible for an exemption from registration 
requirements to offer, sell, or deliver securities by jurisdictional means.2  
The costs of compliance with the disclosure requirements of the 1933 
Act are high and exemptions from registration have marketing and 
liquidity restrictions.3  Therefore, securities lawyers try to find loopholes 
to circumvent the 1933 Act’s disclosure system. 
In the late 1960’s, securities practitioners devised and used some 
schemes abusing the “no-sale” theory,4 such as a spin-off, to circumvent 
registration requirements under the 1933 Act.  The Securities and 
Exchange Commission (hereinafter the SEC) supported the “no-sale” 
theory, embodying it in Rule 133.5  In 1972, the SEC recognized the 
 
* Member of the New York Bar; SJD Candidate at Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington. 
The author wishes to thank Professors J. William Hicks, Hannah L. Buxbaum, and Donna M. Nagy 
at IU School of Law-Bloomington for their encouragement. This article does not reflect the views of 
the professors. 
 1. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77e et seq. (West 2006). 
 2. Jurisdictional means include “any means or instruments of transportation or 
communication in interstate commerce or of the mails.” 15 U.S.C.A. § 77e(a) (West 2006). 
 3. Securities which are not sold in registered public offerings have limitations on manner of 
offering and restrictions on resale. That is, transaction exemptions contain prohibitions against 
general solicitation and general advertising (marketing restriction) and the subsequent public resales 
include the volume and manner of sale limitations (liquidity restriction). See J. William Hicks, 
Protection of Individual Investors Under U.S. Securities Laws: The Impact of International 
Regulatory Competition, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 431, 446-451 (1994) [hereinafter Hicks, 
Protection of Individual Investors] (discussing “limitations on manner of sale” and “resale 
restrictions”). 
 4. See infra Part II.B. 
 5. 17 C.F.R. § 230.133 (1971) (rescinded by Release No. 5316, infra note 6). 
1
Kim: Rule 145: On Clarity and Predictability
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2007
KIM 3/19/2007  12:22:52 PM 
132 AKRON LAW REVIEW [40:131 
loopholes exploited by the “no-sale” theory and adopted Rule 145, 
rescinding Rule 133.6  Rule 145 requires registration and restricts resale 
of securities issued under a reorganization or recapitalization plan that is 
subject to security holders’ approval.7 
Rule 145 has achieved mixed success.  The SEC succeeded in 
abolishing the “legal formalism” of the “no-sale” theory by requiring the 
securities issued in certain recapitalizations or reorganizations described 
in Rule 145(a)8 (hereinafter the Rule 145 transaction) to be subject to 
disclosure requirements.  However, the Commission failed to make clear 
and predictable the registration requirements for the issuance and resale 
of securities in connection with a Rule 145 transaction.  Rule 145 is 
complex9 and incongruous with the general congressional intention of 
the 1933 Act.  Thus, it involves the following theoretical and practical 
problems. 
First, Rule 145(a) fails to provide a clear standard for determining 
whether a certain recapitalization or reorganization involves a sale to 
trigger registration requirements.  In real practice, the concept of the 
“material change” in security holders’ rights has rightly served as a 
standard for the SEC to determine if there is a sale for the purpose of 
Rule 145.10  However, the SEC has not codified the “material change” 
criterion. 11   The SEC has sometimes given priority to other policy 
considerations over the “material change” standard to determine the 
occurrence of a sale, which made the SEC’s interpretation of Rule 
 
 6. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5316, 1972 SEC LEXIS 243, at *1 (Oct. 6, 1972). 
 7. 17 C.F.R. § 230.145 (2006). 
 8. Id. at §230.145(a) (setting forth the types of transactions covered by Rule 145). 
 9. Professor Macey is very skeptical of complex rules and regulations under securities laws. 
He appropriately argues that complex and technical disclosure requirements led to Enron’s financial 
fraud. See Jonathan R. Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure, and Enron, 89 
CORNELL L. REV. 394, 421 (2004). 
 10. See, e.g., First Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Company and Canada Life 
Insurance Company of New York, SEC No-Action Letter, 2005 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 860, at *19 
(Dec. 22, 2005); Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada (U.S.), Keyport Life Insurance Company, 
SEC No-Action Letter, 2003 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 825, at *22 (Dec. 23, 2003); Rydex Advisor, 
SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 923, at *12 (Sept. 29, 1998). 
 11. The codified “material change” standard will restrain both substantively and procedurally 
undue exercises of the SEC staff discretion in issuing no-action letters relating to Rule 145(a). The 
“material change” criterion will help keep Rule 145(a)-related no-action letters consistent with the 
general principle of the 1933 Act, the tenor of Rule 145, and related no-action letters. See Rutheford 
B. Campbell, Jr., Rule 145: Mergers, Acquisitions and Recapitalizations under the Securities Act of 
1933, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 277, 340 (1987) [hereinafter Campbell, Rule 145]. The criterion will 
also prevent the SEC staff from “creating substantive law [through the no-action letter process] . . . 
without any checks and balances which are inherent in our system of government.” Lewis D. 
Lowenfels, SEC No-Action Letters: Conflicts with Existing Statutes, Cases and Commission 
Releases, 59 VA. L. REV. 303, 321 (1973). 
2
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145(a) unpredictable and inconsistent.  The SEC’s ad-hoc approach 
without a clear standard for the concept of “sale” creates risks that the 
staff may define a transaction which is not “functionally equivalent to 
surrendering the old security for a new one”12 as a “sale” or exclude a 
transaction resulting in a “material change” from the disclosure 
requirements of the 1933 Act. 
Second, Rule 145(c)13 and (d),14 as special resale provisions for 
“securities acquired in a Rule 145 transactions” (hereinafter Rule 145 
securities), are inconsistent with general resale provisions under the 
1933 Act.  The SEC’s authority to establish Rule 145 was mandated by 
provisions of the 1933 Act.15  Accordingly, the resale provisions of Rule 
145 cannot deviate from the general resale rules under the 1933 Act.16  
Whereas general provisions of the 1933 Act define the term 
“underwriter” focusing on investment intent, Rule 145(c) imposes 
underwriter status focusing on control relationship.  There is no 
legislative ground for the different definition of “underwriter” from the 
general definition of the 1933 Act.  The “statutory underwriter” of Rule 
145(c) unreasonably restricts the resale of Rule 145 securities. 
Finally, ambiguous and inconsistent SEC interpretations concerning 
Rule 145 impede efficient market pricing and increase transaction costs.  
Basically, market liquidity for securities maintains the efficiency of 
stock pricing. 17   Trading restrictions on “presumptive underwriters” 
defined in Rule 145(c) decrease the market liquidity for Rule 145 
securities and, accordingly, the reduced liquidity obstructs fair pricing of 
the securities.  Also, the SEC has overly relied on “no-action letters,”18 
 
 12. JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 399 (5th ed. 
2006) (citing SEC v. Associated Gas & Electric Co., 99 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1938)) [hereinafter COX 
ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION]. 
 13. 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(c) (2006). 
 14. Id. at § 230.145(d) (providing a safe harbor for unregistered resales by Rule 145 
affiliates). 
 15. Section 19(a) states that “[t]he Commission shall have authority from time to time to 
make, amend, and rescind such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions 
of this title . . . .” 15 U.S.C.S. § 77s (LexisNexis 2006). 
 16. Interpretive rules “cannot impose obligations on citizens that exceed those fairly 
attributable to the legislature through the process of statutory interpretation.”  73 C.J.S. Public 
Administrative Law and Procedure § 168 (2006) (citing U.S. v. Yuzary, 55 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 17. “Increased liquidity improves market efficiency . . . .”  Jonathan R. Macey, et al., 
Restrictions on Short Sales: An Analysis of the Uptick Rule and its Role in View of the October 1987 
Stock Market Crash, 74 CORNELL L. REV.  799, 811 (1989). 
 18. “A no-action letter is one in which an authorized staff official indicates that the staff will 
not recommend any enforcement action to the Commission if the proposed transaction described in 
the incoming correspondence is consummated.”  SEC Securities Act Release No. 6253, 1980 SEC 
LEXIS 443, at *1 n.2 (Oct. 28, 1980). 
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instead of interpretive releases, as guidelines in the interpretation and 
application of Rule 145.  The legal ambiguity and unpredictability 
caused by the loose issuance of SEC no-action letters confuses business 
planners of Rule 145 transactions.  Therefore, securities lawyers 
representing issuers in Rule 145 transactions try to seek comfort with 
more no-action inquiries, creating vicious circles of no-action letters, 
which increases costs of Rule 145 transactions.  High costs of Rule 145 
transactions may hamper the efficient allocation of economic resources 
through recapitalizations or reorganizations. 
The above-mentioned problems with Rule 145 appear at every 
stage of a Rule 145 type transaction: reckless issuance of no-action 
letters at a business planning stage, inconsistent standards for 
determining a “sale” at a registration stage, and over-extension of the 
“underwriter” concept at a resale stage.  This article will analyze 
problems shown in every stage of a Rule 145 transaction. 
II.  SALE OR NO-SALE ARGUMENT 
A.  Why Sale or No-Sale Matters 
A “sale” 19  is a threshold requirement for the registration and 
prospectus delivery under Section 5 of the 1933 Act.20  In connection 
with reclassifications and reorganizations, the preliminary note to Rule 
145 of the 1933 Act characterizes a “sale” as a transaction involving a 
“new investment decision” of security holders.21  To provide securities 
holders with information for making well informed sell-hold-buy 
decisions, the term “sale” triggers the registration and prospectus 
requirements. 
Whether there is a sale or not, shareholders may receive material 
information under the proxy rules.  Even if there is a sale, however, the 
proxy rules do not apply to companies whose securities are not 
 
 19. Section 2(a)(3) of the Securities Act of 1933, a definition section, provides “[t]he term 
‘sale’ or ‘sell’ shall include every contract of sale or disposition of a security or interest in a 
security, for value.”  15 U.S.C.A. § 77b(a)(3) (West 2006) (emphasis added). 
 20. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77e (West 2006). 
 21. Preliminary Note to Rule 145 states: 
[A]n offer, offer to sell, offer for sale, or sale occurs when there is submitted to security 
holders a plan or agreement pursuant to which such holders are required to elect, on the 
basis of what is in substance a new investment decision, whether to accept a new or 
different security in exchange for their existing security. 
17 C.F.R. § 230.145 (2006) (emphasis added). 
4
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registered under Section 12(g) of the 1934 Act22 and some state laws do 
not require a shareholder approval of a certain recapitalization or 
reorganization.  In those cases, the registration and prospectus delivery 
under the 1933 Act may be the only disclosure requirements for security 
holders to make well-informed investment decisions. 
A “sale” is also a prerequisite to limitations on resale of securities 
derived from the nature of a transaction exemption.23  The nature of a 
sale determines whether the securities issued are restricted or 
unrestricted.  For example, if an investor acquires securities in a private 
placement, the securities will be restricted.24  If a non-control person 
acquires securities in a registered public offering, the securities will be 
unrestricted.  If an investor receives securities in a transaction involving 
“no-sale,” however, the transaction is neutral to the status of securities25 
and new securities acquired in the no-sale transaction succeed to the 
status of the surrendered securities. 
Accordingly, in order to resell the securities acquired in a “no-sale” 
transaction, securities holders must find out the status of the underlying 
stocks which were exchanged for new securities.  If the underlying 
stocks were unrestricted, the recipients of the new securities can freely 
resell them to the public.  Conversely, if the underlying stocks were 
restricted, the new shareholders are subject to restrictions on resale to the 
public.  Thus, to avoid the risk of illegal distribution of unregistered 
securities, a would-be seller must cautiously decide if his or her 
acquiring of securities involved a “sale.”  Whether there is a sale or no-
sale matters to protect public investors from the secondary distribution 
through the abuse of a “no-sale” rule. 
The above-mentioned disclosure issues at both primary and 
secondary distribution stages are the concern of Section 5.  Another 
primary concern of the 1933 Act is to “prevent frauds in the sale” of 
securities.26  The “sale” concept also triggers the anti-fraud and civil 
 
 22. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n (West 2006); see also 15 U.S.C.S. § 78l (LexisNexis 2006); 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.12g-1 (2006). 
 23. See J. WILLIAM HICKS, RESALES OF RESTRICTED SECURITIES § 2:7 (2006), available at 
WESTLAW, SECRESR § 2:7 [hereinafter HICKS, RESALES]. 
 24. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(a)(3) (2006) (defining the term “restricted securities”). 
 25. In other words, restricted securities stay restricted and unrestricted securities remain 
unrestricted as results of transactions involving no-sale. See Campbell, Rule 145, supra note 11, at 
316-17. 
 26. See the Preamble to the Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) 
(stating that purpose of Securities Act of 1933 is “[t]o provide full and fair disclosure of the 
character of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce and through the mails, and to prevent 
frauds in sale thereof”). 
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liability provisions.27 
B.  The No-Sale Theory 
An exchange or alteration of outstanding securities in a business 
combination, reorganization, or a similar transaction requiring the 
authorization of security holders seems to be somewhere between a sale 
and a no-sale.  On one hand, it is not shareholders’ volitional actions, but 
a corporate action, that converts outstanding securities into new 
securities in a business combination submitted to a shareholder vote or 
consent.28  That is, a shareholder vote only triggers operation of law 
which then makes a security transaction effective.29  In such a case, there 
is “no sale” and the shareholder vote is only subject to proxy disclosure 
requirements.30  On the other hand, however, if we focus on the whole 
process of the business combination transaction including the issuance 
of new securities, we can consider a proposal for the transaction 
submitted to security holders’ authorization as an “offer to sell” under 
Section 2(a)(3) and Section 5 of the 1933 Act.  Consequently, there is a 
sale involved in the reorganization plan and the security holders 
receiving new securities under the plan are entitled to disclosure required 
by the 1933 Act. 
The “no-sale” theory is based on the assumption that a shareholder 
vote for a certain corporate reorganization does not involve individual 
investment decisions, but only a shareholder authorization of corporate 
action, 31  so the transaction includes “no sale” and requires no 
registration.  At an early stage of the 1933 Act’s enactment, the SEC 
tended to deal with the business combination under the “no-sale” 
theory32 and then required neither registration nor limited resales by the 
 
 27. See generally J. WILLIAM HICKS, CIVIL LIABILITIES: ENFORCEMENT AND LITIGATION 
UNDER THE 1933 ACT (2006), available at WESTLAW, SECCIVIL §§ 1:1-7:35. 
 28. See J. William Hicks, The Concept of Transaction as a Restraint on Resale Limitations, 
49 OHIO ST. L.J. 417, 455 (1988). 
 29. Shareholder’s volitional act is the key element of a “sale.” So, if a unanimous shareholder 
approval is required for a transaction, it involves a “sale.”  Also, if control shareholders of a target 
company negotiate a security transaction with an acquiring company and the shareholder vote is 
only a matter of formality, there is a “sale.” See Note, Business Combinations and Registration 
Requirements: Rule 145, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 929, 932 (1972) [hereinafter Business Combinations]. 
 30. See generally THOMAS LEE HAZEN & DAVID L. RATNER, SECURITIES REGULATION: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 162-65 (6th ed. 2003) (explaining the proxy rules in the context of the 
Securities Law of 1934). 
 31. Rutheford B. Campbell, Resale of Securities Under the Securities Act of 1933, 52 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV.  1333, 1363 (1995) [hereinafter Campbell, Resale]. 
 32. At the beginning stage of the 1933 Act, the Federal Trade Commission functioning as a 
predecessor of the SEC treated the issuance of securities in a business combination taken through 
6
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recipients of new securities.33  In 1951, the SEC adopted Rule 133 under 
the 1933 Act, embodying the “no-sale” theory in it.34 
C.  The Abuse of Rule 133 and Amended Rule 133(c) 
Since the adoption of Rule 133, the SEC had been troubled by 
unregulated resales of securities acquired in transactions within the 
meaning of Rule 133 (hereinafter Rule 133 securities).35  Under the “no-
sale” theory embodied in Rule 133, a reorganization or recapitalization 
submitted to security holders’ approval (hereinafter Rule 133 
transaction) did not involve a sale.36  Thus, it was theoretically hard to 
impose an underwriter status on a Rule 133 security holder because a 
recipient in a Rule 133 transaction did not “purchase” securities with a 
view to distribution within the meaning of Section 2(a)(11) of the 1933 
Act.  Accordingly, resales of Rule 133 securities could easily be 
interpreted as “transactions by any person other than an issuer, 
underwriter or dealer”37 within the meaning of the Section 4(1) trading 
exemption.38 
Some private companies abused Rule 133 to “go public” without 
registration under Section 5 of the 1933 Act.39  As the public distribution 
of unregistered securities through the abuse of Rule 133 gave rise to 
serious problems, the court and the SEC started amending the “no-sale” 
rule.  In SEC v. Micro-Moisture Controls, Inc., the Southern District 
Court of New York did not apply Rule 133 to the case in which the 
exchange of assets for stock was only “a step in the major activity of 
selling the stock.”40  Also, in Great Sweet Grass Oils, Ltd.,41 the SEC 
 
shareholder vote as involving a sale and required Form E-1 for the registration. See generally SEC 
Securities Act Release No. 167, 1934 SEC LEXIS 79 (May 18, 1934). But see SEC Securities Act 
Release No. 493(Class C), 1935 SEC LEXIS 716 (Sept. 20, 1935) (supporting “no-sale” theory). 
See also William H. Heyman, Implications of Rule 145 under the Securities Act of 1933, 53 B.U. L. 
REV. 785, 786 (1973) [hereinafter Heyman, Implications]. 
 33. See HICKS, RESALES, supra note 23, at § 3:18. 
 34. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 3420, 1951 SEC LEXIS 23 (Aug. 2, 1951). 
 35. It might be because Mergers and Acquisitions had increased since Rule 133 was adopted.  
Through the misuse of Rule 133 in those transactions, many private companies wanted to “go public 
without the expense, disclosure and potential liability involved in registration.” See Heyman, 
Implications, supra note 32, at 786-87. 
 36. Campbell, Resale, supra note 31, at 1363. 
 37. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77d(1) (West 2006). 
 38. Section 4(1) of the 1933 Act excludes ordinary market trading from the 1933 Act 
disclosure requirements. 
 39. See infra Part IV.C.3 (explaining the “spin-off” scheme). 
 40. SEC v. Micro-Moisture Controls, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 558, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). 
 41. In re Great Sweet Grass Oils, Ltd., 37 S.E.C. 683 (1957), aff’d per curiam, 256 F.2d 893 
(D.C. Cir. 1958). 
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ruled that Rule 133 would not be applicable to a case where there was “a 
pre-existing plan . . . to use stockholders merely as a conduit for 
distributing a substantial amount of securities to the public”42 or “the 
persons negotiating an exchange, merger or similar transaction have 
sufficient control of the voting stock to make a vote of stockholders a 
mere formality . . . .”43  The Commission also ruled that the Section 4(1) 
exemption would not be applicable if “the issuer or persons acting on its 
behalf participate in arrangements” to distribute Rule 133 securities to 
the public.44 
In 1959, the SEC amended Rule 133 by adopting Rule 133(c) and 
Form S-14. 45   In Rule 133(c), the Commission defined as an 
“underwriter” any constituent corporation or any person who was an 
affiliate of a constituent corporation at the time of voting and acquired 
securities of the issuer in connection with Rule 133 transaction with a 
view to distribution.  However, Rule 133(c) was still based on the “no-
sale” theory. 
D.  The Sale Theory and Rule 145 
Rule 133(c) defined affiliates of any party to a Rule 133 transaction 
at the time of voting as underwriters within the meaning of Section 
2(a)(11) of the 1933 Act to limit the resale of unregistered Rule 133 
securities.46  However, the term “underwriter” as defined by Section 
2(a)(11) was premised on the occurrence of a “sale,”47 while Rule 133(c) 
was based on the “no-sale” theory.  Thus, there was a contradiction that 
the “underwriters” within the meaning of Rule 133(c) were deemed to 
have “purchased” securities for purposes of Section 2(a)(11), but were 
deemed to have “not purchased” securities for purposes of Section 5 
 
 42. Id. at 690. 
 43. Id. at 691. 
 44. Id. at 690. 
 45. See generally SEC Securities Act Release No. 4115, 1959 SEC LEXIS 320 (July 16, 
1959). 
 46. Id. at *3-4. Amended Rule 133(c) provided: 
Any constituent corporation, or any person who is an affiliate of a constituent 
corporation at the time any transaction specified in paragraph (a) is submitted to a vote 
of the stockholders of such corporation, who acquires securities of the issuer in 
connection with such transaction with a view to the distribution thereof shall be deemed 
to be an underwriter of such securities within the meaning of section 2(11) of the Act. A 
transfer by a constituent corporation to its security holders of securities of the issuer 
upon a complete or partial liquidation shall not be deemed a distribution for the purpose 
of this paragraph. 
Id.  
 47. See infra Part V.B. 
8
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registration requirements.48 
Also, Rule 133(c) focused not on the purchaser’s lack of investment 
intent, but on the control relationship with a party to a Rule 133 
transaction.  Once you had been an affiliate of an acquired company at 
the time of the vote for a Rule 133 transaction, you could not resell Rule 
133 securities even if you became a non-affiliate of an acquiring 
company.  The rule engendered unfair results.  First, if you had not been 
an affiliate of the acquired company, you could have resold as many 
Rule 133 securities as you wanted without registration.49  Second, if you 
had acquired securities in a voluntary exchange, you could have resold 
the unregistered securities irrespective of the control relationship with 
your company, if not a presumptive underwriter of selling securities.50 
The logical inconsistency and practical unfairness of Rule 133(c) 
put the SEC in the crossfire of criticism from security lawyers and legal 
scholars.  In 1969, a special study of disclosure problems under the 1933 
and 1934 Acts, prepared by the SEC staff under the supervision of then-
Commissioner Francis M. Wheat (the “Wheat Report”),51 pointed out the 
“disclosure gap” in deciding on a business combination and the unfair 
resale limitation posed by the underwriter definition under Rule 133(c).52 
In 1972, reflecting recommendations made in the Wheat Report, the 
SEC adopted Rule 145 and simultaneously rescinded Rule 133, stating 
that “[f]ormalism should no longer deprive investors of the disclosure to 
which they are entitled.”53  Rule 145 is based on the idea that, given “the 
substance of the transactions specified therein”54 and “the fundamental 
nature of the relationship between the stockholders and the 
corporation,”55 there is a “volitional act on the part of the individual 
stockholder required for a ‘sale’”56 in a Rule 145 transaction.  Therefore, 
there is a need for investor protection by means of disclosure. 57  
 
 48. See Business Combinations, supra note 29, at 941. 
 49. See HICKS, RESALES, supra note 23, § 3:18 (citing Throop, Recent Developments with 
Respect to Rule 133, 15 BUS. LAW. 119, 122 (1959)). 
 50. See Business Combinations, supra note 29, at 941-42. 
 51. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 4963, 1969 SEC LEXIS 686, at *1 (April 14, 1969). 
 52. See Heyman, Implications, supra note 32, at 788-91 (quoting SEC, Disclosure to 
Investors: A Reappraisal of Federal Administrative Policies under the ‘33 and ‘34 Acts (Disclosure 
Policy Study, 1969)). 
 53. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5316, supra note 6, at *6-7. 
 54. Id. at *5. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at *4. 
 57. Bruce Alan Mann, Rule 145 and Section 3(a)(9) of the Securities Act of 1933, 700 
PLI/Corp 575 [hereinafter Mann, Rule 145].  A securities law practitioner states: 
Rule 145 was adopted in 1972 to eliminate the difference between the disclosure 
9
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However, Rule 145 failed to eliminate all the problems arising from the 
“no-sale” theory.  For example, Rule 145(c), based on the “sale” theory, 
regulates the resale of “registered” securities in a similar manner as Rule 
133(c) based on the “no-sale” theory did.  This vestige of “no-sale” 
theory in Rule 145 still creates many theoretical and practical problems. 
III.  RULE 145 AND ITS DISCLOSURE SYSTEM 
A.  General Understanding of Rule 145 
Generally, the provisions of Rule 145 consist of three sections.  
First, Rule 145(a) sets forth certain types of recapitalizations and 
reorganizations and subjects them to the registration requirements under 
Section 5 of the 1933 Act.58  Second, Rule 145(b)59 deals with the prior 
announcement concerning a Rule 145 transaction providing some 
relaxation of conventional “gun-jumping” prohibitions. 60   Lastly, 
paragraphs (c) and (d) of Rule 145 cover the resale restriction on the 
registered securities issued in a Rule 145 transaction.61 
Rule 145(a) requires registration of securities issued in a non-
exempted Rule 145 transaction using the term “sale” as a triggering 
event.  Form S-4 is designed for a certain business combination and 
mostly used for the registration of Rule 145 securities.62  As a Rule 145 
transaction requires registration, it is also subject to the “gun-jumping” 
prohibition under Section 5(c) of the 1933 Act.  To give a safe harbor 
from the “gun-jumping” prohibition, Rule 145(b) excludes certain 
limited announcements of a business combination from the definition of 
an offer to sell or a prospectus under the 1933 Act.63 
 
obligations and protections afforded by the 1933 Act in stock for stock acquisitions and 
in mergers, consolidations and acquisitions of assets. . . . Since January 1, 1973, mergers, 
consolidations and sales of assets followed by liquidation have been treated in a manner 
similar to a stock-for-stock exchange. 
Id. 
 58. 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(a) (2006). 
 59. Id. at § 230.145(b). 
 60. Gun-jumping is an illegal attempt to condition the market for future sales. See generally 
Eric A. Chiappinelli, Gun Jumping: The Problem of Extraneous Offers of Securities, 50 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 457 (1989). 
 61. 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(c), (d) (2006). 
 62. Subcommittee on Annual Review, Annual Review of Federal Securities Regulation, 40 
BUS. LAW. 997, 1008 (1985). 
 63. Rule 145(b) states, “Communications made in connection with or relating to a transaction 
described in paragraph (a) of this section that will be registered under the Act may be made under 
[Rule 135, Rule 165 or Rule 166].”  17. C.F.R. § 230.145(b) (2006). 
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Rule 145(c) and (d) deal with the resale of Rule 145 securities.  
Rule 145(c) imposes underwriter status on any party to a Rule 145 
transaction, other than the issuer, or any person who is an affiliate of 
such party when the transaction is submitted for security holders’ 
authorization. 64   Rule 145(d) excludes from underwriter status any 
person defined as an underwriter by Rule 145(c) in the following three 
circumstances: (1) When the securities are sold in accordance with the 
Rule 144 requirements, excluding the holding period and notice filing 
requirements;65 (2) When the seller who is a non-affiliate of the issuer 
has held the securities for at least one year and the issuer meets the 
information requirements of Rule 144;66 or (3) When the seller who is a 
non-affiliate of the issuer has held the securities for at least two years 
and has not been an affiliate within the last three months.67 
B.  Form S-4 
Form S-4 is the registration form of securities to be issued in 
connection with following transactions: (1) Rule 145 type transactions; 
(2) Mergers without “the solicitation of the votes or consents of all of the 
security holders of the [target] company” under the applicable state law; 
(3) Exchange offers for securities of the issuer or another entity; (4) 
Public reoffers or resales of any securities acquired according to Form S-
4; and (5) More than one of the above-listed transactions registered on 
one registration statement.68 
Form S-4, as a successor to Form S-14,69 is based on the idea that 
“decisions made in the context of business combination transactions and 
those made otherwise in the purchase of a security in the primary or 
trading market are substantially similar.”70  Form S-4 adopts the “S-1-2-
3 approach.”71  The preparation of Form S-4 depends on whether the 
company is a Form S-1, Form S-2, or Form S-3 registrant:72 Form S-4 
 
 64. 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(c). 
 65. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(c), (e), (f), and (g) (2006). 
 66. Id. at § 230.144(c), (d). 
 67. Id. at § 230.144(d). 
 68. 17 C.F.R. § 239.25 (2006). 
 69. Form S-4 replaced Forms S-14 and S-15 in 1985. SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-
6578, 1985 SEC LEXIS 1687 (Apr. 23, 1985). See also SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-6611, 
1985 SEC LEXIS 2477 (Nov. 22, 1985) (rescinding Form S-14 and adopting Form N-14); SEC 
Securities Act Release No. 33-6579, 1985 SEC LEXIS 1688 (Apr. 23, 1985) (adopting Form F-4 for 
foreign issuer’s registration of securities to be issued in certain business combinations). 
 70. SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-6578, supra note 69, at *9. 
 71. Id.; see Bruce Alan Mann, Rule 145 and Form S-4, 609 PLI/Corp 733. 
 72. Form S-1 is the basic form for registration containing complete information on the issuer 
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allows the incorporation of certain information by reference according to 
“Form S-1-2-3 criteria.” 
The security holders’ decision on a business combination involves 
fewer volitional acts than other investment decisions.  Form S-4 
identifies the difference between business combination decisions and 
other purchases of securities.73  Form S-4 provides special provisions to 
reflect the special nature of a business combination transaction.  All 
Form S-4 prospectuses include particularly tailored information for a 
business combination. 74   Also, the Form requires the prospectus 
containing information incorporated by reference to be delivered to 
shareholders at least 20 business days in advance of the date of their 
investment decision.75 
Form S-4 reflects the integrated disclosure system76 to relieve the 
burden of disclosure on issuers and to give potential buyers simplified 
and streamlined information for their investment decisions excluding 
unnecessarily voluminous information.  When adopting Form S-4, the 
Commission pointed out that “the documents delivered to security 
holders in the context of business combinations (mergers and exchange 
offers) are frequently unwieldy, often 150 or more pages.”77  Form S-4 
integrates prospectuses under the 1933 Act and proxy statements and 
periodic reports under the 1934 Act.  When a business combination 
transaction is subject to both Form S-4 under the 1933 Act and the proxy 
rules of Regulation 14A under the 1934 Act,78 any proxy statements in 
Form S-4 will satisfy the requirement of the 1934 Act filing.79 
Form S-4 consists of two parts. 80   Part I contains information 
required in the prospectus which is divided into four sections: (1) 
information about the transaction, (2) information about the registrant, 
(3) information about the company being acquired, and (4) voting and 
 
and transaction in the prospectus. Form S-2 requires less disclosure and Form S-3 requires the least 
amount of disclosure. 17 C.F.R. §§ 239.11-.13 (2006). 
 73. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-6578, supra note 69, at *9-10. 
 74. See Simon M. Lorne & Joy Marlane Bryan, ACQUISITIONS AND MERGERS: NEGOTIATED 
AND CONTESTED TRANSACTIONS § 3:39 (2006), available at WESTLAW, SECACQMERG § 3:39. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-6578, supra note 69, at *3 (“Form S-4 employs 
the principles underlying the integrated disclosure system . . . .”). 
 77. See id. at *5. 
 78. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 to .14b-1 (2006) (providing detailed rules as to the steps to be 
followed in connection with proxy solicitation). 
 79. Id. at § 240.14a-6(j) (stating merger proxy materials). 
 80. See U.S. Securities and Exch. Comm’n, Form S-4 (Registration Statement Under 
Securities Act of 1933), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/forms-4.pdf (last visited Oct. 
25, 2006). 
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management information.81  Part II requires information not required in 
the prospectus relating to indemnification of directors and officers, 
exhibits and financial statement schedules, and undertakings.82 
Thanks to the integrated disclosure system underlying Form S-4, 
issuers in Rule 145 transactions can reduce disclosure costs.  For 
example, in a Rule 145 merger transaction, the issuer does not have to 
pay the fee for filing the proxy solicitation under Regulation 14A if a 
registration statement on Form S-4 is filed. 83   However, securities 
market participants think that the filing of a Form S-4 registration 
statement is expensive and time-consuming: legal and accounting fees, 
printing costs, and filing fees total more than $250,000; moreover, the 
SEC’s review takes several months.84  Consequently, many securities 
practitioners are still looking for the exemptions from registration to 
reduce compliance costs. 
C.  Shareholder Communications in Rule 145 Transactions 
Rule 145 subjects certain business combination transactions to 
Section 5 of the 1933 Act.  Section 5(a) prohibits the sale of securities 
until a registration statement is in effect.85  Section 5(c) prohibits all oral 
and written offers in advance of the filing of a registration statement.86  
In a Rule 145 transaction, offerees are the shareholders of the company 
involved.  Thus, any communication with the shareholders as to the 
proposed transaction poses a risk of constituting an “offer” within the 
meaning of Section 2(a)(3).87 
To obtain shareholder approval of a certain business combination 
plan, an issuer needs to notify its shareholders of the proposal or the 
shareholder meeting prior to the filing of a registration statement.  On its 
face, it may be viewed as “gun-jumping” that violates Section 5(c).  Rule 
145(b) associated with Rule 135, Rule 165, and Rule 166 relaxes the 
gun-jumping restrictions.88 
 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6(j)(2) (2006). 
 84. See Thomas R. Taylor & Bradley R. Jacobsen, M&A Transactions under Utah’s New 
“Fairness Hearing” Statute, 16 UTAH BAR J. 24, 26 (2003) [hereinafter Taylor & Jacobsen, M&A]. 
 85. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77e(a) (West 2006). 
 86. Id. at § 77e(c). 
 87. Id. at § 77b(a)(3) (defining an offer as “every attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation 
of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a security, for value”). 
 88. 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(b) (2006) (providing that communications in connection with a Rule 
145 transaction “that will be registered under the [1933] Act may be made under [Rule 135, Rule 
165 or Rule 166]”). 
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Rule 135 prevents the announcement of a Rule 145 transaction 
prior to the filing of the S-4 registration statement from being deemed an 
“offer.”  The exempted communication, for example, in the form of a 
press release, must include no more than: (1) The names of the issuer 
and “any other parties to the transaction;” (2) “A brief description of the 
business of the parties to the transaction;” (3) “The date, time and place” 
of the security holder meeting; and (4) “A brief description of the 
transaction and the basic terms of the transaction.”89 
Rule 135 limits the content of communication to the basic 
announcement of a planned business combination and substantially 
eradicates Section 5(c)’s concerns about gun-jumping.  As the prior 
notice of a business combination plan will not be deemed to be an 
“offer,” 90  it is not subject to the anti-fraud liability under Section 
12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act.91 
Even though a Rule 135 notice is not viewed as preconditioning the 
market for the securities to be issued, it arouses the interest of market 
participants.  Given the highly technical and complicated reality of 
today’s financial market, many analysts and shareholders, especially 
institutional investors, have strong desires to know about the reason for 
the proposed business combination and its anticipated effects before they 
are available for Form S-4 or a joint proxy statement/prospectus.  
Sometimes, the acquiring companies face the necessity of disclosing 
some information during the pre-filing or pre-effectiveness period when 
the stock prices fall significantly on worries about coming business 
combinations.92  Recognizing this problem, the SEC adopted Regulation 
M-A and Rules 162, 165, 166 and 425 to relax communication 
restrictions in connection with business combinations.93 
Rule 165 creates a safe harbor for a business transaction against the 
“gun-jumping” prohibition.94  Rule 165 exempts “free writing” during 
post-filing period 95  and “prior notice” during pre-filing period from 
 
 89. Id. at § 230.135(a)(2)(viii)(D). 
 90. Id. at § 230.425(b). 
 91. See 15 U.S.C.S. 77l(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2006). 
 92. See LOU R. KLING & EILEEN T. NUGENT, NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS OF COMPANIES, 
SUBSIDIARIES AND DIVISIONS § 5.02 (2006) (stating that “[o]ften, companies, particularly acquirors, 
that failed to provide the information found that the trading price of their stock dropped 
significantly”), available at WESTLAW, NACOMP § 5.02. 
 93. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-7760, 1999 SEC LEXIS 2291 (Oct. 22, 1999). 
 94. 17 C.F.R. § 230.165 (2006). 
 95. In the so-called Aircraft Carrier Release, the SEC showed its belief that “the waiting 
period [that is, post-filing period] should be a time of open dialogue between the registrant and its 
potential investors, provided that the registrant is accountable for the accuracy and completeness of 
its communications.”  SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-7606A, 1998 SEC LEXIS 2858, at 254 
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Sections 5(b)(1) and (c) if the prospectus is promptly filed with SEC 
under Rule 42496 or 42597 and contains a legend to remind the investors 
to read the SEC-filed documents.  Rule 166 exempts from Section 5(c) 
any communication in advance of the first public announcement of a 
business combination, provided that “the participants take all reasonable 
steps within their control to prevent further distribution or publication of 
the communication until either the first public announcement is made or 
the registration statement related to the transaction is filed.”98 
Although communications in reliance on the above-mentioned 
exemption provisions are exempted from “gun-jumping” restrictions, 
some communications are subject to anti-fraud liability under Section 
12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act.99  The SEC worries that strict application of 
anti-fraud liability under the 1933 Act would cause a chilling effect on 
all the communications relating to business combinations.  Accordingly, 
Section 12(a)(2) applies when business combination-related 
communications constitute “offers,” which, the SEC believes, can strike 
a balance between investor protections and free communications. 100  
Whereas Rule 135 notices are excluded from the term “offer” within the 
meaning of Section 2(a)(3), communications pursuant to Rule 165 
constitute “offers” and are therefore subject to Section 12(a)(2) liability 
under the 1933 Act. 
As Rule 145(b) applies only to a business combination-related 
communication, it does not alleviate “gun-jumping” prohibitions in 
connection with general capital-raising transactions.  The preliminary 
notes to Rule 165 or 166 do not permit the exemption when the primary 
purpose of the transaction is to condition the market for future sales in 
spite of technical compliance with the safe harbor rule.101  This business 
purpose test is another effort by the SEC to protect investors without 
chilling business combination transactions. 
 
(Nov. 13, 1998). 
 96. 17 C.F.R. § 230.424 (2006). 
 97. Id. at § 230.425. 
 98. Id. at § 230.166. 
 99. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77l(a)(2) (West 2006). 
 100. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-7760, supra note 93, at *37-43. 
 101. The preliminary notes state that “[t]he exemption does not apply to communications that 
may be in technical compliance with this section, but have the primary purpose or effect of 
conditioning the market for another transaction, such as a capital-raising or resale transaction.”  17 
C.F.R. §§ 230.165-.166 (2006). 
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IV.  RULE 145 TRANSACTIONS 
A.  In General 
Under Rule 145(a), the issuance of securities in exchange for 
securities under a reorganization or recapitalization plan which is 
submitted for security holders’ authorization involves an “offer, offer to 
sell, offer for sale, or sale” of securities, which triggers the registration 
requirements of the 1933 Act.102  Rule 145(a) is the embodiment of the 
above-mentioned “sale” theory.103  The legislative purpose of Rule 145 
is to help the voting security holders to make well-informed investment 
decisions.  If, under a state law, a recapitalization or reorganization is 
carried out without security holders’ approval, it will not fall within the 
meaning of a Rule 145 type transaction because it leaves no room for 
helping security holders’ investment decisions.104 
Although Rule 145 indicates that the submission of the proposal for 
a Rule 145 transaction to a shareholder vote involves a “sale,” questions 
still remain as to what the “sale” is in connection with registration 
requirements.  To qualify as a “sale” for purposes of Rule 145, a security 
contract or security disposition should meet the definition of a sale 
within the meaning of Section 2(a)(3) of the 1933 Act.  Section 2(a)(3) 
requires a transaction to be “for value” to involve a sale.105 
B.  The “For Value” Requirement: The Framework for the Term “Sale” 
As in other transactions under the 1933 Act, the securities to be 
issued in Rule 145 transactions require registration under Section 5 of 
the 1933 Act unless exemptions are available.  Accordingly, the term 
“sale” under Rule 145 has the same meaning as the term “sale” used in 
Section 2(a)(3) of the 1933 Act.  Section 2(a)(3) defines the term “sale” 
as a transaction involving “every contract of sale or disposition of a 
security or interest in a security, for value.”106  In many cases, the “for 
value” requirement of Section 2(a)(3) becomes a keyword in the 
definition of the “sale.” 
According to Section 2(a)(3), any issuance of securities for no 
value, such as free stocks, does not involve a sale which triggers the 
 
 102. 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(a) (2006). 
 103. For a review of “the sale theory and Rule 145,” see supra Part II.D. 
 104. See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 503 (9th ed. 2003) [hereinafter COFFEE & SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION]. 
 105. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77b(a)(3) (West 2006) . 
 106. Id. 
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operation of disclosure and anti-fraud provisions of the 1933 Act.  
However, as a commentator says, “Value Is Not Always What It 
Seems.”107   For example, when you get free stocks on condition of 
mailing to the issuer, the information of your name and address on the 
envelope may be regarded as consideration of the issuance of free 
stocks.108  The term “value” is a flexible and functional concept.  The 
substance of a transaction as a whole is more important than the legal 
form in determining whether securities are issued “for value.” 
In ordinary securities transactions, cash is exchanged for securities.  
On the other hand, in Rule 145 transactions, existing securities are 
exchanged for new securities.  Thus, in Rule 145 transactions, it is an 
important issue if the existing security as a consideration has a 
“different” value from the new securities to be issued.  A “material” 
change in security holders’ rights involves a “sale,” even though it does 
not take the form of a conventional sale.  For example, when an issuance 
of new securities that is subject to a shareholder vote results in a 
significant alteration of dividend rights, the shareholders have to make a 
new investment decision about the exchange of existing securities for 
substantially changed securities.  Therefore, in Rule 145 transactions, the 
issue of the “for value” requirement to be a “sale” boils down to whether 
there is a material change in security holders’ rights. 
C.  Transactions Covered by Rule 145 
1.  Recapitalizations109 
Rule 145(a)(1) subjects a “reclassification of securities” 110  to 
disclosure requirements under Section 5 of the 1933 Act. 111   Rule 
145(a)(1) excludes recapitalization in the form of “a stock split, reverse 
 
 107. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 12, at 395. 
 108. See, e.g., Andrew Jones and James Rutten, SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 SEC No-Act. 
LEXIS 555 (June 8, 1999) (stating that the issuance of securities in consideration of a person’s 
registration with the issuer, whether or not through the issuer’s internet site, would be an event of 
sale within the meaning of section 2(a)(3) of the Securities Act of 1933). 
 109. The term “recapitalization” means an “adjustment or recasting of a corporation’s capital 
structure . . . through amendment of the articles of incorporation . . . .”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
1295 (8th ed. 2004).  Recapitalizations include the exchange of stock for another class of stock and 
the exchange of debt for another kind of debt of the same company. 
 110. Many securities law scholars use the same meaning for “recapitalization” and 
“reclassification” in Rule 145(a)(1).  COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 12, at 411 
(stating that “[t]hree types of Rule 145 transactions . . . are . . . recapitalizations, mergers, and 
certain transfers of assets . . . .”). 
 111. 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(a)(1) (2006). 
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stock split, or change in par value” from the definition of “sale.”112  The 
exclusion of changes in par value from Rule 145 registrations is a logical 
conclusion of the “for value” theory.  A stock split involves no change in 
the valuation of stocks, because only the number of stocks is changing 
according to the exchange ratio of a stock split.  Therefore, there is no 
exchange of different values, no “sale” within the meaning of Section 
2(a)(3), and then no “disclosure requirement” under Section 5.113 
A reverse stock split114 seems to cause a change in a shareholder’s 
proportional ownership and thus there may be a worry that it can be used 
to “squeeze-out”115 minority shareholders.116  A securities law scholar 
argues that “one should be wary of concluding that reverse stock splits, 
which clearly come within the letter of the exception of Rule 145(a)(1), 
necessarily involve no sale of a security.”117  Also, he explains that 
“[s]hareholders who receive stock in that transaction . . . are voting to 
receive a materially changed investment contract” and it triggers Rule 
145 registration requirements. 118   He has a good point in that it is 
improper to presume that any reverse stock split does not include a 
material change in shareholders’ rights.119 
 
 112. Id. 
 113. SEC staffs also believe that in such a capitalization “no investor protection purpose would 
be served by requiring registration.” Rydex Advisor, SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 SEC No-Act. 
LEXIS 923, at *12 (Sept. 29, 1998). 
 114. A securities law expert states that a reverse stock split is “the conventional stock split in 
reverse—instead of a company amending its charter so as to have more shares authorized and 
outstanding, the charter is amended so as to reduce dramatically the authorized and outstanding 
shares.”  Paul H. Dykstra, The Reverse Stock Split – That Other Means of Going Private, 53 CHI. 
KENT L. REV. 1, 3 (1976). 
 115. In Kiriakides v. Atlas Food Sys. & Servs., Inc., the Supreme Court of South Carolina 
stated: 
“Freeze out” is often used as a synonym for “squeeze out.” The term squeeze out means 
the use by some of the owners or participants in a business enterprise of strategic 
position, inside information, or powers of control, or the utilization of some legal device 
or technique, to eliminate from the enterprise one or more of its owners or participants. 
541 S.E.2d 257, 267 n.26 (S.C. 2001) (citing F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, 
O’NEAL’S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS, § 1.01 at 1 (2d ed. 1999)). 
 116. Suppose, for example, that each of a few control shareholders have more than 1,000 
shares of a company and each of the other minority shareholders has less than 1,000 shares.  The 
major shareholders can decide on a recapitalization of a 1,000 to 1 reverse stock split.  As the result, 
each major shareholder has more than one newly-issued share while minority shareholders retain no 
share.  In this way, the technique used in the squeeze-out is that many minority shareholders are left 
with a fractional share after a reverse stock split submitted to a shareholder vote and then the 
company buys out the fractional share to cause substantial change in its stock ownership structure. 
 117. Campbell, Rule 145, supra note 11, at 285. 
 118. Id. at 284-85. 
 119. Id. at 284 (arguing that “a reverse stock split may involve a material change in the rights 
of shareholders, making it unwise to assume that no sale is involved”). 
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However, a “material change” test should be strictly applied to 
reverse stock split cases because Rule 145 may not serve as a cost-
effective safeguard for the remaining shareholders in a squeeze-out.120  
The SEC proxy rules121 or the going private rules122 require mandatory 
disclosures to protect the minority shareholders of a certain publicly-
held company.  Even if those rules are not applied, state law fiduciary 
duties can serve a minority shareholder protection against “going-
private.”123  Given enough mandatory disclosures relating to a squeeze-
out, Rule 145 protection, as another layer of mandatory disclosure, may 
only increase disclosure costs and cause a chilling effect on reasonable 
reverse stock splits. 
2.  Mergers or Consolidations 
Under Rule 145(a)(2), a merger or consolidation requires 
registration when it involves security holders’ approval and then an 
issuance of securities.124  In a Rule 145 merger or consolidation, the 
submission of the proposal to security holders’ approval is deemed to be 
an “offer” within the meaning of Section 2(a)(3) of the 1933 Act.125  
Even though the acquiring company does not offer, the target company 
can make an offer on behalf of the issuer.  In a short-form merger, a 
“sale” is involved only when the minority shareholders of the target have 
to choose between securities of the acquirer and appraisal rights for 
dissenters.126 
 
 120. A securities law practitioner indicates: 
[T]he cost to prepare a Form S-4 can often exceed $ 250,000 and take up to four months 
to navigate through the SEC review process. Moreover, another cost of filing a Form S-4 
that should not be overlooked is the SEC filing fee, which is based on the value of the 
securities being registered and can be several thousand additional dollars. 
Taylor & Jacobsen, M&A, supra note 84, at 24. 
 121. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n (West 2006). 
 122. Going private transactions are regulated by fiduciary duties at the state level and 
disclosure requirements at the federal level.  See generally COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION, 
supra note 12, at 959-66. 
 123. Generally, “[a] going private transaction is a transaction or series of transactions instituted 
by the controlling shareholders of a publicly held corporation and designed to eliminate or 
substantially reduce the corporation’s outstanding public equity, thereby returning the corporation to 
private ownership.”  Harold N. Islen, Comment: Regulating Going Private Transactions: SEC Rule 
13e-3, 80 COLUM L. REV. 782, 782 (1980) (footnote omitted). 
 124. 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(a)(2) (2006). 
 125. Therefore, it must meet the registration requirements of Section 5(c) of the 1933 Act. See 
Mann, Rule 145, supra note 57, at 579. 
 126. “Because Rule 145(a) is couched in terms of offers arising in connection with a 
submission for the vote or consent of security holders, short-form mergers not requiring such vote 
or consent are not within the scope of the Rule.”  SEC Securities Act Release No. 5316, supra note 
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Rule 145(a)(2) provides an exception to the registration 
requirements in mergers or consolidations when “the sole purpose of the 
transaction is to change an issuer’s domicile solely within the United 
States . . . .” 127   Any change-of-domicile merger from one state to 
another state brings about a change in applicable state laws.  If the 
change results in a material change in shareholders’ rights or a “change 
in the form of legal entity,” 128  the Rule 145(a)(2) exception is not 
available and registration is required.129  The “sole purpose” test for the 
change-of-domicile exception under Rule 145(a)(2) can be interpreted to 
be functionally equivalent to the “material change” criterion. 
“[T]he change of domicile exception does not apply when a change 
of national jurisdiction is involved”130 because the change in applicable 
laws causes a significant change in shareholders’ rights.131  In 1985, the 
SEC amended Rule 145(a)(2) to allow the change-of-domicile exception  
only when the transaction occurred “solely within the United States.”132  
In issuing no-action letters, however, the SEC staff would not like to be 
bound by the language of Rule 145(a)(2), “solely within the United 
States.”  The staff took a no-action position on a change in domicile 
within Canada because it would not “effect a change in national 
 
6, at *14-5. 
 127. 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(a)(2) (2006). 
 128. ROBERT J. HAFT, ANALYSIS OF KEY SEC NO-ACTION LETTERS § 8:4 (2006), available at 
WESTLAW, SECKEYNAL S 8:4 [hereinafter HAFT, NO-ACTION LETTERS].  See, e.g., Producers 
Chemical Corporation, SEC No-Action Letter, 1975 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1767, at *1 (Sept. 4, 
1975) (taking the position that “the significant change in the issuer’s organizational structure . . . 
will result in a material change in shareholders rights and their relationship to the new entry”). 
 129. In a Release, the SEC took the following view: 
Regardless of where the new corporate entity is domiciled, the exception set forth in 
Rule 145(a)(2) is not applicable [when] the transaction involves a significant change in 
the form of the issuer’s legal entity and results in a significant change in a security 
holders’[] economic interest. Accordingly, absent an applicable statutory exemption, the 
securities issued in the transaction are required to be registered under the Act. 
SEC Securities Act Release No. 5463, 1974 SEC LEXIS 3448, at *13 (Feb. 28, 1974). 
 130. SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-6535, 1984 SEC LEXIS 1583, at *37 (May 9, 1984). 
 131. The SEC staff allowed a company to change its domicile from Canada to Maryland 
without registration under the 1933 Act. Scudder International Investments, Ltd., SEC No-Action 
Letter, 1975 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1354 (July 5, 1975).  A few years later, however, the SEC staff 
did not permit Rule 145(a)(2) exception when a corporation changed its domicile from Delaware to 
the Cayman Islands. “With specific reference to the change of domicile exception of Rule 145(a)(2), 
the staff [drew] a sharp distinction between changes of domicile effected entirely within the United 
States or North America and those involving a change from within the United States to a totally 
foreign domicile.” Apco Argentina, Inc, SEC No-Action Letter, 1979 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2211 
(Feb. 12, 1979) (citing CACI, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1977 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2688 (Nov. 
14, 1977)). 
 132. SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-6579, supra note 69, at 3*6; 17 CFR 230.145(a)(2) 
(2006). 
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jurisdiction with respect to the Company.”133  The SEC staff was right in 
applying the “material change” standard to the change-of-domicile 
transaction.  However, it is undesirable for the SEC staff to extend the 
change-of-domicile exception through the no-action letter without the 
revision to the language of Rule 145(a)(2).  In 1985, the SEC expressly 
restricted the change-of-domicile exception through the amendment of 
Rule 145(a)(2).  Therefore, the staff should have narrowly interpreted 
the exception clause in accordance with the Latin maxim, exceptio est 
strictissimae interpretationis. 
In many cases, the change-of-domicile transactions are performed 
along with reorganizations.  The staff allowed the change-of-domicile 
exception in the change of an investment company’s form from a limited 
partnership in New York to a corporation in Maryland.134  However, the 
staff required registration in the change of a private cooperative stock 
company from a cooperative form to a corporation form indicating that 
“[the change-of-domicile] exception cannot be expanded to cover other 
transactions, such as a change in organizational form, because such 
transactions often involve significant changes in the rights and 
responsibilities of shareholders, officers and directors.”135  The change in 
organizational form is more likely to change shareholders’ rights when 
combined with a change of domicile.  However, the staff did not explain 
why the change of domicile makes the change in issuer’s legal entity 
easier and what the difference between the limited partnership case and 
the cooperative case is.136 
3.  Transfer of Assets and Spin-Offs 
The mechanism of a transfer of assets in exchange for stock is 
complex because the shareholders acquire securities not as a direct result 
of their individual decision but by a plan or agreement.  A transfer of 
assets in exchange for stocks involves a sale and triggers registration 
 
 133. SmarTire Systems, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2001 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 441, at *1 
(March 29, 2001). See also Fresenius Aktiengesellschaft, SEC No-Action Letter, 2006 SEC No-Act. 
LEXIS 637 (Oct. 10, 2006) (applying the change-of-domicile exception to Fresenius’ conversion 
from German to European corporation). 
 134. See PEMCO, SEC No-Action Letter, 1988 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 635 (May 31, 1988). See 
also Fidelity Exchange Fund, SEC No-Action Letter, 1984 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2440 (July 23, 
1984), cited in Campbell, Rule 145, supra note 11, at 289. 
 135. Rochester Drug Cooperative, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1973 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 421 
(Oct. 5, 1973) (providing that “Rule 145(a)(2) provides an exception from registration only for 
‘change of domicile’ transactions” without consideration of any material change in shareholders’ 
rights), cited in Campbell, Rule 145, supra note 11, at 289 (emphasis added). 
 136. See Campbell, Rule 145, supra note 11, at 289. 
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requirements when it meets Rule 145(a)(3)’s requirements.137  A stock-
for-asset transaction without resolution or distribution does not require 
registration because the company, the asset seller, acquires securities 
like a private placement. 
In a spin-off transaction, a publicly-held company distributes a 
privately-held subsidiary’s stocks to its shareholders to make the 
subsidiary a publicly-owned company.  On its face, the spin-off process 
does not seem to include a transfer for value by shareholders because the 
stock distribution in the process is usually made in the form of stock 
dividend; an ordinary stock dividend does not involve a “for-value” 
transaction. 138   However, the Court and the Commission 139  have 
recognized that the spin-off without independent business purpose can 
 
 137. Rule 145(a)(3) provides that a stock-for-asset transaction involves a “sale” if: 
(i) Such plan or agreement provides for dissolution of the corporation or other person 
whose security holders are voting or consenting; or 
(ii) Such plan or agreement provides for a pro rata or similar distribution of such 
securities to the security holders voting or consenting; or 
(iii) The board of directors or similar representatives of such corporation or other person, 
adopts resolutions relative to paragraph (a)(3) (i) or (ii) of this section within 1 year after 
the taking of such vote or consent; or 
(iv) The transfer of assets is a part of a preexisting plan for distribution of such 
securities, notwithstanding paragraph (a)(3) (i), (ii) or (iii) of this section. 
17 C.F.R. § 230.145(a)(3) (2006). 
 138. The Second Circuit held that “[a] stock dividend does not distribute property but simply 
dilutes the shares as they existed before.”  Hafner v. Forest Laboratories, Inc., 1964 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 8892, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff’d, 345 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1965). 
  Professor Loss said, “‘it just cuts the same pie into smaller slices.’” LOUIS LOSS & JOEL 
SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATIONS § 3-A-2 (3d ed. 2001), available at LEXIS, SECURITIES 
REGULATIONS 3d §3-A-2. 
 139. In a Release, the SEC stated that: 
While the distribution of the shares to the acquiring company’s shareholders may not, in 
itself, constitute a distribution for the purposes of the Act, the entire process . . . can have 
that consequence. . . . [T]he shares which are distributed in certain spin offs involve the 
participation of a statutory underwriter and are thus . . . subject to the registration 
requirements of the [1933] Act . . . . 
SEC Securities Act Release No. 4982, 1969 SEC LEXIS 703, at *2 (July 2, 1969). 
  Also, in SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 4, the Division of Corporation Finance took the 
position that a spin-off is not subject to the registration requirements of the 1933 Act if it meets the 
following five requirements: 
(1) The parent shareholders do not provide consideration for the spun-off shares; 
(2) The spin-off must be pro rata; 
(3) The parent must provide adequate information to its shareholders and the trading 
markets; 
(4) Valid Business Purpose for Spin-Off; and 
(5) If the parent spins-off “restricted securities,” the parent must have held those 
securities for at least two years. 
CF Staff Legal Bulletin No. 4 (Sept. 16, 1997), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/slbcf4.txt (last visited Oct. 25, 2006). 
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be nothing but a device for the spun-off company to have the trading 
market or for a private company to go public through the back door.140  
A spin-off, as a transfer of assets, may meet the elements of Rule 
145(a)(3) when the shareholders of a selling corporation are asked to 
vote on the issuance of shares in connection with the spin-off. 
Focusing on the entire process of a set of transactions, in SEC v. 
Datronics Engineers, Inc.,141 the Fourth Circuit held the development of 
a trading market for the spin-off company’s shares as a “value” which 
constitutes a “sale” and triggers the disclosure requirements under the 
1933 Act.142  The case has a strong significance in that the existence of a 
trading market has an economic value because the trading market for 
securities of a private company provides liquidity and increases the 
value of the securities.  However, if the spin-off is not submitted to a 
shareholder vote, but is decided by the board of directors, it does not 
involve a “sale.” 143  The information provided by the disclosure system 
of the 1933 Act is for security holders to decide which investment 
options to pursue.  Where a spin-off is approved only by a board of 
directors and the shareholders have no option, there is no risk that voting 
shareholders will lack information required to make material investment 
decisions.144  The board’s approval can be reviewed in terms of fiduciary 
 
 140. Historically, many private companies going public without registration assumed the form 
of a “spin-off shell.”  In the first phase of the scheme, a publicly-owned company creates a wholly-
owned subsidiary and distributes the subsidiary-shell’s stocks to the parent company’s shareholders.  
In the second phase, the spun-off subsidiary, which has gone public, is merged with a private 
company which has already acted in collusion with the parent company to go public without the 
1933 Act’s regulation. See Leib Orlanski, Going Public through the Backdoor and the Shell Game, 
58 VA. L. REV. 1451, 1468-69 (1972). 
Before the adoption of Rule 145, both phases required no registration - in the first phase due to the 
“for value” theory and in the second phase thanks to the “no-sale” theory. 
 141. SEC v. Datronics Engineers, Inc., 490 F.2d 250 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 
937 (1974). 
 142. Id.  See also SEC v. Harwyn Industries Corp., 326 F. Supp. 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (holding 
that the transactions which involved distribution of a subsidiary’s unregistered shares through the 
spin-off scheme to create public trading market of the shares violated the purpose of Section 5 under 
the 1933 Act). 
 143. In Isquith v. Caremark Int’l Inc., Judge Posner held that in a spin-off which was not 
subject to the shareholder approval, “[t]he members of the class did not buy or sell shares in [a 
parent company].  They did not buy or sell shares in [a spun-off subsidiary].  They simply received 
one share of [the subsidiary’s] stock for every four shares they owned of [the parent company].”  
136 F.3d 531, 534 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Rathborne v. Rathborne, 683 F.2d 914 (5th Cir. 1982)). 
Illustration F in SEC Securities Act Release No. 5463 indicates that shareholders’ approval is 
necessary to trigger Rule 145 registration requirements. See SEC Securities Release No. 5463, 
supra note 1299, at *15-6.  But see Richard J. Morgan, Offers to Buy Under the Securities Act of 
1933, 1982 ARIZ ST. L.J. 809, 818-21 (1982) (arguing that Datronics case involved an offer “to 
buy” to trigger registration requirements). 
 144. See Campbell, Rule 145, supra note 11, at 296-99. 
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duties.  Also, spin-off transactions are also regulated under the 1934 Act 
and the Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990.145  Therefore, the reasoning of 
Datronics extended the “sale” concept beyond the legislative scope of 
the 1933 Act. 
The real concern of spin-offs lies in the secondary distribution of 
securities of a spun-off company to the public without adequate 
information. 146   Thus, the SEC thinks much of the availability of 
information concerning the spun-off company in the regulation of spin-
offs.  The SEC adopted Rule 15c2-11 of the 1934 Act to provide the 
over-the-counter “pink sheet” market with specified information on 
companies whose stocks are quoted.147  Also, as the spin-off scheme can 
be associated with manipulation of penny stocks, it is regulated by Rule 
15g-9’s penny stock suitability requirements148 and other provisions of 
the Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990. 
4.  Exempted Rule 145 Transactions 
The preliminary note to Rule 145 provides that “[t]ransactions for 
which statutory exemptions under the [1933] Act, including those 
contained in sections 3(a)(9), (10), (11) and 4(2), are otherwise available 
are not affected by Rule 145.” 149   Accordingly, a reorganization or 
recapitalization within the meaning of Rule 145 which involves a sale 
can be exempted from registration requirements under certain exemption 
provisions: Sections 3(a)(9)150 and (10)151; intrastate offerings exempted 
 
 145. The Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 
101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). Penny Stock Rules consist of 
Rules 15g-1 through 15g-6, 15g-8 and 15g-9. See SEC Exchange Act Release No. 34-30608, 1992 
WL 97553 (April 20, 1992) (adopting Rule 3a51-1 and Rules 15g-1 through 15g-6 pursuant to the 
Penny Stock Reform Act); SEC Exchange Act Release No. 34-30577, 1992 SEC LEXIS 867 (April 
13, 1992) (adopting Rule 15g-8). See also SEC Exchange Act Release No. 34-49037, 2004 SEC 
LEXIS 45 (Jan. 8, 2004) (proposing amendments to the penny stock rules). 
 146. “The losers in [a certain spin-off] are those who buy the shares in the trading market 
without the benefit of disclosure.” GARY M. BROWN, UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIES LAWS 77 
(2006), 1556 PLI/Corp 49. 
 147. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-11 (2006). See also SEC Exchange Act Release No. 9310, 1971 
SEC LEXIS 195 (Sept. 13, 1971). 
 148. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15g-9 (2006) (providing “[s]ales practice requirements for certain low-
priced securities”).  See SEC Exchange Act Release No. 34-32576, 1993 SEC LEXIS 1588 (July 2, 
1993) (amending Rule 15c2-6 and redesignating it as Rule 15g-9). 
 149. 17 C.F.R. § 230.145 (2006) (Preliminary Note). 
 150. Section 3(a)(9) exemption is for a single company recapitalization. See 15 U.S.C. § 
77c(a)(9) (2006).   
The exemption reflected the economic policy to give an opportunity to make a “fresh start” to 
companies in financial trouble. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 12, at 418-22. 
Currently, however, Section 3(a)(9) has been used more widely than before, for example, as a legal 
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by Section 3(a)(11)152 and Rule 147153; private placements or private 
offerings under Section 4(2)154 or Regulation D155; and small offering 
exemptions under Regulation A.156  These exemptions can relieve the 
chilling effect of Rule 145’s registration requirements on business 
combinations.  As exemptions are exceptional in the disclosure system 
of the 1933 Act, the person who claims the exemption has the burden of 
proof.157 
Rule 145 transactions are categorized into registered transactions 
and exempted transactions.  If an issuer meets the requirements of any 
exempted Rule 145 transaction, he has an option between the exemption 
and Rule 145 registration.  In exemptions associated with Rule 145 type 
transactions, other investor protection vehicles still exist.  Even though 
issuers are exempted from registration under the 1933 Act, they remain 
subject to antifraud provisions of Section 12(2) of the 1933 Act and 
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.158  The submission of those exemptions to 
a shareholder vote may trigger compliance of proxy rules under Section 
14 of the 1934 Act159 if the securities to be exchanged are registered 
under Section 12 of the 1934 Act.160  The resale restriction on securities 
acquired in an exempted transaction safeguards the public against 
making uninformed investment decisions. 
 
tool for “going private” or “poison pills.” See J. William Hicks, Recapitalizations under Section 
3(a)(9) of the Securities Act of 1933, 61 VA. L. REV. 1057, 1060-71 (1975) (explaining a variety of 
uses of the section 3(a)(9) exemption) [hereinafter Hicks, Recapitalizations]. 
 151. Section 3(a)(10) provides an exception to registration for securities acquired in a 
judicially or administratively approved reorganization or recapitalization.  15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(10) 
(2006). 
 152. Section 3(a)(11) exempts from registration any offer or sale of securities to residents 
within a single state by an issuer who resides in or is incorporated in the same state and doing 
business in the state.  15 U.S.C.S. § 77c(a)(11) (LexisNexis 2006). 
 153. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (2006). 
 154. Registration requirements under Section 5 of the 1933 Act do not apply to “transactions 
by an issuer not involving any public offering.”  15 U.S.C.S. § 77d(2) (LexisNexis 2006). 
 155. Regulation D consists of three exemptions: the exemption for limited offerings and sales 
of securities not exceeding $1,000,000 under Rule 504, the exemption for limited offerings and 
sales of securities not exceeding $ 5,000,000 under Rule 505, and the private offering under Rule 
506.  17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504-.506 (2006). 
 156. Even though the language of the preliminary note to Rule 145 does not include Regulation 
A, the list of exemptions is illustrative, not exclusive.  Regulation A is a kind of mini-registration 
promulgated under Section 3(b) of the 1933 Act. It contains Rules 251-264.  Id. at §§ 230.251-.264. 
 157. See 7 J. WILLIAM HICKS, EXEMPTED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 
1933 § 1:10 (2006), available at WESTLAW, SECEXTRANS § 1:1 [hereinafter 7 HICKS, 
EXEMPTED TRANSACTIONS]. 
 158. See Hicks, Protection of Individual Investors, supra note 3, at 437. 
 159. 15 U.S.C.S. § 78n (LexisNexis 2006). 
 160. Id. at § 78l. 
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D.  A Clear and Predictable Standard for the Definition of “Sale” within 
the Meaning of Rule 145(a) 
The “sale” is a conceptual tool to trigger the disclosure requirement 
for the purpose of the 1933 Act.  Determining whether a sale is involved 
in Rule 145 type transactions involves a multi-factor test.  First, we 
should use the above–mentioned “sale” theory and “for value” 
requirement.  Then, we should focus not on the traditional sale concept, 
but on the “material change” in security holders’ rights that is 
“functionally equivalent to surrendering the old security for a new 
one.”161 
The real problem of the interpretation of Rule 145(a) lies in the lack 
of a clear standard to determine whether a business combination 
involving a shareholders’ authority and an issuance of new securities 
involves a “sale.”  The SEC’s interpretations and applications of Rule 
145 transactions have been inconsistent.  Recently, a securities lawyer 
made a no-action inquiry for a change-of-domicile exception arguing 
that “on numerous occasions the Staff has taken a ‘no-action’ position 
confirming that the Rule 145(a)(2) exception is available where a change 
in the state of domicile is accompanied by significant revisions in the 
company’s charter and bylaws . . . .”162 
Responding to the inquiry, the SEC staff accepted the argument and 
took a no-action position despite the risk that the proposed 
reincorporation transaction might significantly alter the shareholders’ 
rights.  Deciding the inquiry, the staff seems to focus on saving 
unnecessary procedure for the incorporation.  The staff might support 
the following argument in the inquiry that: 
[I]f the changes in corporate organization were not instituted in 
connection with the change of domicile, they could be effectuated . . . 
at a later date through charter amendment adopted with the same 
shareholder approval, to which the registration provisions of the 
Securities Act would not apply.  Since the same goals could be 
achieved in two steps, the exception provided by Rule 145(a)(2) should 
not be held inapplicable merely because the two steps are more 
expeditiously and economically combined into a single reincorporation 
 
 161. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 12, at 399. 
 162. Russell Corporation, SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 488, at *36 
(March 18, 2004) (citing General Electric Capital Corporation, SEC No-Action Letter, 2000 SEC 
No-Act. LEXIS 757, (July 26, 2000); Community Financial Corporation, SEC No-Action Letter, 
1996 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 574 (July 1, 1996)). 
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procedure requiring shareholder approval.163 
However, the SEC staff is not empowered to give priority to the 
procedural efficiency of reincorporation over the Commission’s 
longstanding “material change” test for the purpose of Rule 145’s 
registration requirements. 164  In issuing no-action letters, allowing 
multiple policy considerations into the judgment of “sale” decreased 
legal clarity and predictability in the application of Section 5. 
The Commission may not want to lose the flexibility in the 
interpretation and application of Rule 145.  However, to maintain the 
predictability and clarity concerning registration requirements of Rule 
145, Rule 145(a) should define a recapitalization or business 
combination as a “sale” only when the transaction results in “a material 
change in shareholders’ rights.”165  Then, a last critical question remains: 
What is the “material change?”  A securities law scholar suggests the 
essential elements in judging “materiality” include “changes in 
distribution of control, rights to share in the profits of the enterprise, 
limited liability and tax treatment.”166  The “change” should be reviewed 
in light of economic reality.  Accordingly, a change in corporate form 
without economic alteration does not constitute a “sale.” 167   The 
 
 163. Russell, supra note 1622. 
 164. A securities law scholar supports the SEC staff’s “procedural efficiency approach 
avoiding the two-step process,” arguing that: 
[If] proposed reincorporation requires compliance with the proxy rules and full 
disclosure of the impact on stockholder rights plus the required percentage vote of 
stockholders under the law of the first state, it is entirely consistent with the purposes of 
Rule 145 to allow the change of domicile exception to apply despite significant 
alterations in shareholder rights. 
HAFT, NO-ACTION LETTERS, supra note 1288, at § 8:6. The scholar seems to take the change-of-
domicile exception as an exception to the “material change” standard. However, the “sole purpose” 
test for the change-of-domicile exception is based on the “material change” criterion. More 
importantly, it is improper for the SEC staff to extend the scope of the change-of-domicile 
exception through issuing no-action letters going beyond the language of Rule 145(a)(2). 
A scholar claims that “[b]y permitting the two steps to be combined into a single transaction 
exempt under the change-in-domicile exception, the Commission has eliminated the need for 
expensive and needless corporate procedures.” Campbell, Rule 145, supra note 11, at 287. This 
author, however, would like to make clear that it is not the SEC but the SEC staff members who 
have unofficially developed the procedural efficiency rule without a rulemaking process. 
According to Section 2(b) of the 1933 Act, the Commission can consider “efficiency, competition, 
and capital formation” as well as investor protection in ruling making concerning Rule 145 issues.  
15 U.S.C.S. § 77b(b) (LexisNexis2006).  Therefore, if there were a related SEC rule and the SEC 
staff rightly balanced investor protection and market efficiency, the no-action position in the Russell 
case could be justified. 
 165. A material change in shareholders’ rights includes a material change in corporate structure. 
See HAFT, NO-ACTION LETTERS, supra note 1288. 
 166. Campbell, Rule 145, supra note 11, at 289. 
 167. See, e.g., INDRESCO, Inc., SEC No Action Letter, 1995 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 789 (Oct. 
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“material change” must be “functionally equivalent to surrendering the 
old security for a new one.”168 
V.  RESALE OF RULE 145 SECURITIES 
A.  In General 
After issuance of securities, subsequent resales by recipients of the 
securities may also create disclosure concerns of Section 5 under the 
1933 Act.169  The disclosure requirements of the 1933 Act extend their 
reach to the resale that is a “distribution.”170  Section 4(1) of the 1933 
Act distinguishes an unregulated “trading transaction” from a regulated 
“secondary distribution.”171  Under Section 4(1), “transactions by any 
person other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer” as “ordinary market 
transactions” are exempted from the registration requirements of the 
1933 Act.172 
Among issuers, underwriters, and dealers, the term “issuer”173 has 
such a literal meaning that it becomes relatively easy to define, and the 
term “dealer”174 can be exempted from registration under Sections 4(3) 
and (4).175  However, the term “underwriter” is flexibly broad because 
the federal courts’ and the SEC’s approaches to the “underwriter” 
concept are based on functional and transaction-based considerations.176  
It can safely be said that the “underwriter” concept determines the scope 
of Section 4(1) exemption. 
 
31, 1995) (taking an opinion that a change to a holding company structure with the same 
proportionate interest of shareholders involves no sale). 
 168. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 12, at 399. 
 169. 15 U.S.C.S. § 77e (LexisNexis2006). 
 170. Usually, the term “distribution” is used as the same meaning as the term “public offering.” 
See HICKS, RESALES, supra note 23, § 3:32. 
 171. 15 U.S.C.S. § 77d(1) (LexisNexis 2006). See also SEC Securities Act Release No. 5223, 
1972 SEC LEXIS 49 (Jan. 11, 1972) (explaining that Section 4(1) “was intended to exempt only 
trading transactions . . . and not to exempt distributions . . . .”). 
 172. 15 U.S.C.S. § 77d(1) (LexisNexis 2006). 
 173. Id. at § 77b(a)(4). 
 174. Id. at § 77b(a)(12). 
 175. Id. at § 77d(3)-(4). 
 176. While an investment banker may not be an underwriter, an individual investor can be an 
underwriter irrespective of a contract or other privities with the issuer if he or she comes within one 
of Section 2(a)(11)’s categories.  In SEC v. Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association, Inc., the 
Second Circuit defined a person who solicited offers to buy unregistered Chinese government bonds 
not for compensation but for patriotic reasons as an “underwriter.” SEC v. Chinese Consol. Benev. 
Ass’n, Inc., 120 F.2d 738, 741 (2nd Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941). See also SEC v. 
Guild Films Co., 279 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1960); SEC v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d 241 (2nd Cir. 1959). 
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Section 2(a)(11) under the 1933 Act describes the following four 
categories of underwriters:  
(1) “[A]ny person who has purchased from an issuer with a view to . . . 
the distribution of any security[;]” (2) Any person who “offers or sells 
for an issuer in connection with[] the distribution of any security[;]” 
(3) Any person who “participates or has a direct or indirect 
participation” in an undertaking to distribute any security by the above 
(1) or (2) activity; or (4) Any person who “participates or has a 
participation in the direct or indirect underwriting of any such 
undertaking.”177 
The above-stated “issuer” includes “any person directly or 
indirectly controlling or controlled by the issuer, or any person under 
direct or indirect common control with the issuer” for purposes of 
determining “underwriter.”178  Section 2(a)(11) defines anyone who fits 
into one of the above-mentioned categories as an “underwriter” unless 
his “interest is limited to a commission from an underwriter or dealer not 
in excess of the usual and customary distributors’ or sellers’ 
commission.”179  The statutory definition of “underwriter” under Section 
2(a)(11) covers intermediaries in the securities transfer from the issuer to 
the public investors.  Those intermediaries bear burdens of resale 
restrictions and Section 11’s liabilities.180  However, it is not unusual 
that any participant in a public distribution claims that he is an 
underwriter because he can get the benefit of Section 2(a)(3).181  In this 
context, a securities law scholar comments that “the breadth of Section 
2(a)(11)’s definition of underwriter is something of a mixed blessing for 
those fitting within it.”182 
Rule 145(c) defines the term “underwriter” differently from the 
general “underwriter” concept under the 1933 Act. 183  Accordingly, the 
 
 177. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77b(a)(11) (West 2006). 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at § 77k(a). 
 181. Id. at § 77b(a)(3). 
 182. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 12, at 348. 
 183. Rule 145(c) states: 
For purposes of this section, any party to any transaction specified in paragraph (a) of 
this section, other than the issuer, or any person who is an affiliate of such party at the 
time any such transaction is submitted for vote or consent, who publicly offers or sells 
securities of the issuer acquired in connection with any such transaction, shall be deemed 
to be engaged in a distribution and therefore to be an underwriter thereof within the 
meaning of section 2[(a)](11) of the Act.  The term party as used in this paragraph (c) 
shall mean the corporations, business entities, or other persons, other than the issuer, 
whose assets or capital structure are affected by the transactions specified in paragraph 
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resale of Rule 145 securities partly but significantly deviates from the 
general resale rule of the 1933 Act.  Given both statutory and historical 
interpretations of the 1933 Act, there is little justification for the 
different definition of underwriter. 
B.  The “Underwriter” Definition under Rule 145(c) 
Rule 145(c) defines as an underwriter any party to any Rule 145 
transaction “other than the issuer, or any person who is an affiliate of 
such party at the time” of the shareholder vote or consent on the 
transaction. 184   The “underwriter” definition of Rule 145(c) is not 
theoretically consistent with the general “underwriter” concept of the 
1933 Act.  The “underwriter” status under Rule 145 is focused only on 
the control relationship at the time of vote or consent for a Rule 145 
transaction without considering various facto185 showing the purchaser’s 
investment intent. 
Under general resale provisions of the 1933 Act, securities acquires 
in a registered offering are unrestricted securities, 186  and thus the 
acquirer can freely resell them unless he or she is a control person of the 
issuer.187  However, Rule 145(c) imposes an “underwriter” status on a 
non-affiliate of the issuer who acquired securities in a registered Rule 
145 offering.  An affiliate of an acquired company who received 
unrestricted securities in a Rule 145 transaction and became a non-
control person of the issuer is subject to the burdensome resale 
restriction through the operation of the “underwriter” definition under 
Rule 145(c). 
 
(a) of this section. 
17 C.F.R. § 230.145(c) (2006). 
 184. Id. 
 185. A review of the SEC staff responses to requests for no-action letters suggests that: 
[T]he following factors are relevant in deciding whether a person will be deemed a 
statutory [sic] underwriter: (1) Nature of Issuer . . . . (2) Trading Volume . . . .  
(3) Number of Shares Outstanding . . . . (4) Quantity of Shares to Be Acquired . . . .  
(5) Nature of the Offering . . . . (6) Relationship Between Recipient and Issuer . . . .  
(7) Nature of Security . . . . 
7 HICKS, EXEMPTED TRANSACTIONS, supra note 1577, § 9:57. 
 186. For the definition of restricted securities, see 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(a)(3) (2006).    Sales by 
non-control persons of unrestricted securities do not constitute “distributions” and accordingly the 
sellers, non-control persons of the issuer, are not “underwriters.” See id. § 230.144(b). 
 187. Rule 405 defines the term “control (including the terms controlling, controlled by and 
under common control with)” as “the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct or cause 
the direction of the management and policies of a person, whether through the ownership of voting 
securities, by contract, or otherwise.”  Id. at § 230.405 (emphasis added).  For the definition of the 
term “affiliate,” see id. 
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The SEC has been concerned that a control person of a target 
company dumps a large volume of his new shares on the trading market.  
As the financial market expanded and the size of the new-issues market 
increased, it became a serious problem that institutional or other wealthy 
investors acquired a large block of securities in a public offering and 
then resold the securities to the public without the burden of prospectus 
delivery.188  “[T]o prevent resales of large blocks of securities to the 
public without requiring the delivery of a prospectus,”189 the SEC staff 
extended the “underwriter” concept beyond the statutory patterns under 
Section 2(a)(11) of the 1933 Act.  While the underwriter defined in 
Section 2(a)(11) is called the “statutory underwriter,” the extended 
underwriter concept is termed the “presumptive underwriter.”190  The 
concept of “presumptive underwriter” was unofficially developed from 
the SEC’s practice.191  Practically, however, resale restrictions under the 
presumptive underwriter doctrine are too burdensome to the big 
institutional investors. 192   The “underwriter” definition under Rule 
145(c) is another variation of the presumptive underwriter doctrine.193  
Thus, the criticisms of the presumptive underwriter doctrine also apply 
to the “Rule 145 underwriter.” 
Adopting Rule 145, the SEC believed that Rule 145 affiliates 
“usually are in a position to verify the accuracy of information set forth 
in the registration statement, and usually are in a position to influence 
 
 188. See COFFEE & SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 104, at 531. 
 189. 1 HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, GOING PUBLIC HANDBOOK § 2:52 (2006), available at 
WESTLAW, SECGPH-HB § 2:52. 
 190. A person may be deemed to be an underwriter, within the meaning of [Section 2(a) 
(11)] of the Securities Act, if such person purchases or acquires a significant 
percentage of the securities offered pursuant to a registered distribution, except that 
such purchaser is not deemed to be an underwriter if he resells such securities in 
limited quantities. 
Robert J. Ahrenholz & William E. Van Valkenberg, The Presumptive Underwriter Doctrine: 
Statutory Underwriter Status for Investors Puchasing a Specified Portion of a Registered Offering, 
1973 UTAH L. REV. 773, 775-76 (1973) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter Ahrenholz & Valkenberg, 
The Presumptive Underwriter]. 
 191. COFFEE & SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 104, at 532. 
 192. Recognizing the problem, the SEC staff accepted the following view: 
[I]nsurance companies and similar institutional investors generally should not be deemed 
underwriters under Section 2[(a)](11) with regard to the purchase of large amounts of 
registered securities provided such securities are acquired in the ordinary course of their 
business from the issuer or underwriter of those securities and such purchasers have no 
arrangement with any person to participate in the distribution of such securities. 
Securities Act of 1933 Section 2(11) Underwriter, SEC No-Action Letter, 1983 SEC No-Act. 
LEXIS 2542, at *3 (June 10, 1983). 
 193. “Rule 145 is the only Securities Act rule that contains a presumptive underwriter 
provision.” SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-7391, 1997 SEC LEXIS 381, at *31 (Feb. 20, 1997). 
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the transaction”194 and therefore concluded that the Rule 145 “is not 
unreasonably burdensome.” 195   However, an affiliate of an acquired 
company in a Rule 145 transaction may have neither enough access to 
confirm the facts in registration statements, nor competence to influence 
the transaction.  Also, if an affiliate of a target company opposed a 
proposed business combination transaction, but became the non-affiliate 
securities holder of the issuer against his or her will after the Rule 145 
transaction,196 the restriction limitation on the person would be unfair. 
The underwriter status should be determined considering various 
factors such as the purpose of purchasing securities and the contractual 
relationship or other privities with the issuer.  The “control relationship” 
standard of Rule 145(c) is too arbitrary to be consistent with the 
definition of underwriter under Section 2(a)(11) of the 1933 Act.197  In 
1997, the SEC proposed an amendment to Rule 145 that would eliminate 
the so-called “presumptive underwriter” and resale limitation provisions 
treating resales of Rule 145 securities the same as resales of other 
securities.198  Soon after the proposal, the SEC staff indicated that “[i]f 
this proposal is adopted, the staff’s position regarding resale conditions 
[would] be reassessed.”199  However, the SEC has yet to amend Rule 
145(c). 
C.  Interpretative Problems with Rule 145(c) and (d) 
If a person falls within the “underwriter” definition under Rule 
145(c), then Rule 145(d) provides safe harbors for the unregistered 
resales by Rule 145 affiliates.200  The underwriter definition of Rule 
 
 194. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5316, supra note 6, at 20. 
 195. Id. 
 196. See HICKS, RESALES, supra note 23, at § 3:21 (citing Norton Simon, Inc., SEC No-Action 
Letter, 1976 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2169 (Oct. 8, 1976)). 
 197. Whereas Rule 145(a) was based on the “sale” theory, Rule 145(c) was formulated on the 
model of Rule 133(c) which was based on the “no-sale” theory.  See supra Part II.D.  It made Rules 
145(c) and (d) inconsistent with general resale provisions of the 1933 Act.  See HICKS, RESALES, 
supra note 23, at § 3:18 (stating that “[t]he rationale for [Rule 145(c)’s] administrative interpretation 
of Section 2(a)(11) can be traced to the no-sale theory and Rule 133”). 
 198. SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-7391, supra note 1934, at *29-32. 
 199. CF Staff Legal Bulletin No. 3 (July 25, 1997), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/slbcf3.txt (last visited Oct. 25, 2006). 
 200. Rule 145(d) states: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (c), a person or party specified therein shall 
not be deemed to be engaged in a distribution and therefore not to be an underwriter of 
registered securities acquired in a transaction specified in paragraph (a) of this section if: 
(1) Such securities are sold by such person or party in accordance with the provisions of 
paragraphs (c), (e), (f) and (g) of [Rule 144]; 
(2) Such person or party is not an affiliate of the issuer, and a period of at least one year, 
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145(c) and the resale safe harbors of Rule 145(d) do not apply to all Rule 
145 transactions.  The applicable resale rule differs according to 
different types of transactions: a registered Rule 145 transaction; an 
exempted Rule 145 transaction under Section 3(a)(9) or (10), Rule 147, 
or Regulation A; and an exempted Rule 145 transaction under Section 
4(2) or Regulation D.201  Those different resale rules make distributions 
of Rule 145 securities unnecessarily complex. 
1.  Resales of Registered Rule 145 Securities 
Under Rule 145(c), an affiliate of a target company who acquires 
securities in a Rule 145 transaction becomes an “underwriter” even if the 
person is the non-control person of the issuer and the primary offering 
has been registered under Section 5 of the 1933 Act.  If the securities 
holder comes within the “Rule 145 underwriter” definition, the person 
has a few options for resale: the registration of the secondary offering, 
the limited resale under Rule 145(d), and the transaction which is not a 
“distribution.” 
If the person does not fall within the Rule 145 underwriter, the 
person can freely resell the Rule 145 securities.  Adopting Rule 145, the 
SEC explained that “[t]he securities received in a Rule 145 transaction 
by persons who are neither affiliates of the acquired company nor of the 
acquiring company are registered securities without restriction on 
resale.”202  Even though the surrendered securities in a registered Rule 
145 transaction are restricted securities, the registration wipes the resale 
restrictions off the newly-issued securities.203 
The following figure explains applicable resale rules according to 




as determined in accordance with paragraph (d) of [Rule 144], has elapsed since the date 
the securities were acquired from the issuer in such transaction, and the issuer meets the 
requirements of paragraph (c) of [Rule 144]; or 
(3) Such person or party is not, and has not been for at least three months, an affiliate of 
the issuer, and a period of at least two years, as determined in accordance with paragraph 
(d) of [Rule 144], has elapsed since the date the securities were acquired from the issuer 
in such transaction. 
17 C.F.R. § 230.145(d) (2006). 
 201. Campbell, Resale, supra note 31, at 1366. 
 202. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5316, supra note 6, at *20. 
 203. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5463, supra note 1299, at *20 (stating that a non-
Rule 145 affiliate “is immediately free to resell publicly . . . regardless of whether some of his [or 
her] . . . common stock was restricted”). 
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Non-Affiliate of the 
Issuer Affiliate of the Issuer 
Non-Affiliate of 
the Target Company Freely Resell
204 Rule 144 
Affiliate of 
the Target Company Rule 145(d) Rule 145(d)
205 
 
2.   Resales of Rule 145 Securities Acquired in Certain Exempted 
Transactions 
The resale of Rule 145 securities received in a certain exempted 
transaction is treated similarly to the resale of registered Rule 145 
securities.  In an interpretive release, the SEC indicated that: 
Rule 145(d) specifically states that it shall be applicable only to 
registered securities.  Notwithstanding the language of the rule, the 
Division of Corporation Finance, as a matter of discretion, will not 
recommend any enforcement action to the Commission if the 
requirements of Rule 145(d) are followed with respect to resales of 
securities which are issued in a Rule 145 transaction but not registered 
because of the availability of either the Section 3(a)(9) or 3(a)(10) 
exemption, or the Regulation A exemption.  This position of the staff, 
however, does not cover resales under any other exemption.206 
Accordingly, Rule 145(c) and (d) cover the holders who acquired 
Rule 145 securities not only in a registered transaction, but also in an 
exempted one: Section 3(a)(9) or (10), or Regulation A.  As securities 
 
 204. See, e.g., Coastal Int’l., Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter, 1980 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2573 
(Dec. 24, 1980). 
 205. See HICKS, RESALES, supra note 23, at § 3:27. 
 206. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6099, 1979 SEC LEXIS 968, at *89 (Aug. 2, 1979). 
34
Akron Law Review, Vol. 40 [2007], Iss. 1, Art. 4
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol40/iss1/4
KIMFINAL.DOC 3/19/2007  12:22:52 PM 
2007] RULE 145: ON CLARITY AND PREDICTABILITY 165 
acquired in those transactions are unrestricted, 207  a non-Rule 145 
affiliate can freely resell them.208 
A Rule 145 affiliate in the exempted transaction has similar options 
for resale as a typical Rule 145 affiliate has: registration under Section 5 
and exemption under Section 4(1) including Rule 145(d).  A Rule 145 
affiliate is not always in the position to have the issuer file a registration 
statement for the resale.  As the exempted business combination 
transaction leaves no registration statement, the registration of the resale 
costs a lot.209  If the issuer is a non-reporting company under the 1934 
Act, it costs much more.210  Thus, the registration requirement for the 
resale is unduly burdensome to Rule 145 affiliates. 
3.  Resales of Rule 145 Securities Acquired in Private Offerings 
As the exemptions under Section 4(2) and Regulation D are not 
securities exemptions, 211  but transaction exemptions, the resale of 
securities acquired in those exemptions should be subject to registration 
requirements or other available exemptions under the 1933 Act.  In an 
interpretive release, the SEC makes it clear that Rule 145(d) “does not 
cover resales under any other exemption” than Section 3(a)(9) or 
3(a)(10), or the Regulation A exemption.212  Accordingly, the resale of 
the securities acquired in private offerings are subject not to Rule 145(c) 
and (d), but to general resale rules on restricted securities under the 1933 
Act. 
In the resale of securities acquired in an exempted Rule 145 
transaction, the tradability of the securities depends on the nature of the 
 
 207. See HICKS, RESALES, supra note 23, at § 4:55; Campbell, Resale, supra note 31, at 1359-
62. 
 208. If, in a Rule 145 transaction, the old securities exchanged under Section 3(a)(9) or (10), or 
Regulation A had resale limitations of intrastate exemption, the resale of the newly-issued securities 
could be complex.  Professor Campbell takes a good example of this type of dual resale limitation: 
[A]n affiliate of an acquired company holds securities that are subject to the resale 
limitations of Rule 147 and that these securities are exchanged in a Rule 145 transaction, 
which transaction is exempt from registration under section 3(a)(10). The securities 
received in the Rule 145 transaction continue to be subject to the resale limitations of 
Rule 147(e) and, because of the affiliate status of the selling shareholder, are subject also 
to the resale limitations imposed by Rule 145(c). 
Campbell, Rule 145, supra note 11, at 337. 
 209. See id. at 326-27. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Section 3(a)(2) through 3(a)(8) exemptions are securities exemptions.  See Hicks, 
Recapitalizations, supra note 15050, at 1107 (explaining that “Section 3(a)(2) through 3(a)(8) 
exemptions turn on the intrinsic nature of the securities or the impropriety of further governmental 
regulation”). 
 212. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6099, supra note 2067, at 89. 
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exempted transaction.  As Rule 145 securities acquired in private 
offerings under Section 4(2) and Regulation D213 are restricted securities, 
the holders of those securities can resell the securities by registering the 
resale or using Section 4(1) or 4(1 1/2) exemption. 214   The resale 
limitation of surrendered securities in an exempted Rule 145 transaction 
remains in the newly issued securities.215  Consequently, it can cause 
double resale restrictions. 
D.  Inconsistencies Caused by Rule 145(c) and (d) 
The test for the term “underwriter” under Rule 145(c) and the safe 
harbor rule from the underwriter status under Rule (d) have the 
following three systematic problems: inconsistency with the “sale” 
theory, inconsistency with general resale provisions, and inconsistency 
with the current trend in the disclosure system under securities laws. 
1.  Inconsistency with the “Sale” Theory 
Considering the legislative history of Rule 133 and its replacement 
Rule 145, the SEC transplanted Rule 133(c) based on the “no-sale” 
theory to the Rule 145 system based on the “sale” theory. 216   As 
mentioned in Section C of Part II, Rule 133, reflecting the “no-sale” 
theory, had been misused by majority shareholders in a private company 
to distribute their unregistered shares indirectly through a business 
combination.  To prevent it, Rule 133(c) was drafted, identifying any 
person in a control relationship with any party who acquired securities 
“with a view to the distribution thereof” in a Rule 133 transaction as an 
underwriter.217  In this sense, the statutory underwriter concept under 
Rule 133 was a historical necessity.  When Rule 145, based on the “sale” 
theory, replaced Rule 133, the raison d’etre for special underwriter 
definition in connection with business transactions disappeared.  
However, Rule 145(c) was patterned after Rule 133(c) based on the “no-
sale” theory,218 which caused theoretical inconsistencies and practical 
unfairness. 
 
 213. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.506 (2006). 
 214. See generally HICKS, RESALES, supra note 23, §§ 6:1-:22. 
 215. See, e.g., Oracle Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2256, at *1 
(June 17, 1985) (stating that the new securities in exchange for the old securities “as to which resale 
restrictions exist continue to be so restricted, and that the holding period for the [old] stock may be 
tacked to that of the [new] stock”). 
 216. See HICKS, RESALES, supra note 23, at § 3:18. 
 217. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4115, supra note 45, at *3-4. 
 218. See supra Part II.D. 
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Under Rule 133 reflecting the no-sale theory, the securities received 
in a Rule 133 transaction were unregistered.  However, under Rule 145 
reflecting the sale theory, the securities acquired in a Rule 145 
transaction must be registered unless exempted.  Consequently, the 
underwriter definition of Rule 145(c) puts excessive restrictions on the 
resale of registered securities under Rule 145. 
2.  Inconsistency with the General “Underwriter” Concept 
Rule 145(c) defined the term “underwriter” too uniformly 
compared to the general “underwriter” definition provision under 
Section 2(a)(11) of the 1933 Act.  A security holder can be exempted 
from registration under Section 4(1) of the 1933 Act if he proves that he 
is not an issuer, underwriter, or dealer.  A holder of Rule 145 securities 
has purchased the securities from an issuer and therefore faces a risk of 
being an underwriter “who has purchased from an issuer with a view 
to . . . the distribution of any security”219 under Section 2(a)(11) of the 
1933 Act.  By the negative implication of Section 2(a)(11), a security 
holder can exempt himself from a underwriter status by proving his 
trading intention.  The following figure shows how to avoid an 
underwriter status. 
Figure 2: How to Avoid an Underwriter Status 
Resell after an Holding 
Period Subjective 
Exemption 
Without a View to 
Distribute Proving Investment 
Intent 
Objective 
Exemption No Distribution Private Sale 
 
When an affiliate of a target company opposes a Rule 145 
transaction, but the transaction is approved by a majority of shareholders, 
he or she cannot be presumed to acquire securities with a view to 
distribute.  However, Rule 145(c) unreasonably prevents the Rule 145 
affiliate from relying on the Section 4(1) exemption.  The affiliate 
without a view to the distribution is unfairly treated as to his or her 
resale of securities acquired in the Rule 145 transaction.  In addition, the 
resale restriction may decrease secondary market liquidity for the Rule 
 
 219. 15 U.S.C.S. § 77b(a)(11) (West 2006). 
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145 securities and therefore cause inefficient stock pricing.220 
3.  Inconsistency with the Current Trend in Disclosure System 
Newly introduced legislation like Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002221 
and Regulation FD 222  have enhanced disclosure requirements and 
expanded the reach of the federal securities laws.  The Self-Regulatory 
Organizations (SROs), such as the national securities exchanges and 
registered securities associations, require heightened disclosure in their 
listing contracts.  For a non-public company, Rule 15c2-11 of the 1934 
Act requires disclosure of specified information about the company 
including basic financial data to broker-dealers who are publishing 
quotations in over-the-counter “pink sheet” markets.223  In this way, the 
current disclosure system of the securities laws requires more 
disclosures than that of the early 1970s when the SEC adopted Rule 
145.224  Therefore, the SEC’s over-regulation of the resale of securities 
acquired in a Rule 145 transaction is no longer necessary. 
To solve the above-mentioned problems, Rule 145(c) and (d) 
should be repealed and general resale provisions under the 1933 Act 
should be applied to the resale of Rule 145 securities. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Rule 145 is beneficial on the following three points.  First, Rule 
145 overcomes the “no-sale” theory and subjects certain business 
combinations to the registration and prospectus delivery requirements of 
the 1933 Act.  It expands the disclosure requirements of the 1933 Act to 
an area where there were significant loopholes in mandatory disclosure.  
 
 220. The registration requirements under Rule 145(a) guarantee more accurate stock pricing 
and efficient markets.  See Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Why Should Disclosure Rules Subsidize 
Informed Traders?, 16 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 417, 417 (1996) (contending “that disclosure rules 
are justified in ensuring accuracy of prices and that firms would not provide this service without 
regulation”). However, the resale provision of Rule 145(c) restricts the liquidity of certain registered 
securities going beyond general resale rules under the 1933 Act. The reasonable pricing mechanism 
established by Rule 145(a)’s disclosure requirements may be impeded by Rule 145(c)’s resale 
restrictions. 
 221. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in 
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). 
 222. 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100 et seq. (2006). 
 223. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-11 (2006). See also SEC Exchange Act Release No. 34-27247, 
1989 SEC LEXIS 1772 (Sept. 14, 1989). 
 224. The new trend requires a continuous disclosure for publicly traded companies. See 
generally Dale Arthur Oesterle, The Inexorable March Toward a Continuous Disclosure 
Requirement for Publicly Traded Corporations: “Are We There Yet?,” 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 135 
(1998). 
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Second, Rule 145 imposes on an issuer and its control person anti-fraud 
liabilities in connection with a Rule 145 transaction.  Thus, voting 
shareholders can seek to remedy securities fraud violations relating to a 
Rule 145 transaction.  Third, Rule 145(b) provides a safe harbor for the 
announcement of a Rule 145 transaction.  Accordingly, normal 
disclosure practices associated with a Rule 145 transaction can be 
continued without violating Section 5(c)’s “gun jumping” prohibition. 
However, there are many theoretical and practical problems 
associated with the interpretation and application of Rule 145.  These 
problems occur at three stages of securities transactions: excessive and 
inconsistent “no-action letters” 225 at the transaction planning stage, the 
unclear standard for the definition of the “sale” as a triggering event at 
the registration stage, and the unreasonable “presumptive underwriter” 
concept at the resale stage. 
Court decisions and the SEC’s interpretations relating to securities 
law issues are not sufficient to answer most legal inquiries concerning 
Rule 145 transactions.  Given today’s highly technical financial 
environment, experts’ interpretations in SEC no-action letters carry 
important persuasive authority for complicated securities law claims, 
including Rule 145 cases.  Securities market participants take 
compliance with SEC staff interpretations in no-action letters as the 
“least costly alternative.”226  Also, the process of issuing a no-action 
letter is simpler and less burdensome for the SEC.227  However, the SEC 
has overly relied on no-action letters instead of rulemaking or 
interpretive releases.228 
The SEC’s ad hoc approach through no-action letters, combined 
with the SEC’s distinction between the Commission’s views and the 
 
 225. In the current economic and financial environment, securities transactions are highly 
technical and complicated. Accordingly, statutory provisions enacted by Congress and the SEC 
rules and regulations often fail to provide clear-cut guidelines for market participants to follow. 
Many securities lawyers representing securities market participants would like the Commission to 
tailor their opinions to particular securities transactions at a business planning stage. The SEC no-
action letter satisfies these legal demands. “Notwithstanding their status as unofficial and informal 
pronouncements, SEC no-action letters have assumed a considerable degree of importance to 
market participants and their counsel in planning transactions and conducting business.” Donna M. 
Nagy, Judicial Reliance on Regulatory Interpretations in SEC No-Action Letters: Current Problems 
and a Proposed Framework, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 921, 924 (1998) [hereinafter Nagy, Judicial 
Reliance]. 
 226. Id. at 957. 
 227. See generally Thomas P. Lemke, The SEC No-Action Letter Process, 42 BUS. LAW. 1019 
(1987). 
 228. See Campbell, Rule 145, supra note 11, at 342 (arguing that “[m]any of the problems with 
Rule 145 are due, at least in part, to the Commission’s excessive reliance on no-action letters as the 
principal development vehicle for Rule 145”). 
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staff’s views, may guarantee the SEC’s flexibility in the interpretation 
and application of the securities laws relating to similar but 
distinguishable securities cases.229  However, the flexibility amplifies the 
bureaucratic tendencies towards “risk aversion”230 and “disinclination to 
adopt or endorse bright-line rules . . . .”231  In addition, the flexibility on 
the case-by-case basis has been garnered at the cost of legal stability. 
It is not the SEC itself, but only the division staff of the 
Commission who issues SEC no-action letters.  In the closing part of a 
no-action letter, there are words of caution to the effect that “[a]ny 
different facts or conditions might require a different conclusion”232 and 
the responses only express “the positions of the Divisions . . . and do[] 
not express any legal conclusions on the questions presented.”233  The 
SEC’s procedural rule separates the Commission’s views from the 
staff’s views,234 and the SEC is not bound by the staff’s opinions on 
particular cases.235  Given the restricted precedential value of the no-
action letter, too many no-action letters relating to Rule 145 cannot serve 
well as a general interpretive guidance. 236   Rather, they confuse 
securities market participants in connection with Rule 145 issues.  In 
addition, vacillating staff opinions in no-action letters237 cause securities 
practitioners to make more inquiries to the SEC staff, creating a “vicious 
 
 229. Professor Langevoort maintains: 
[T]he Commission’s historic preference for making policy through no-action letters or 
enforcement rather than through rule-making, and in its niggardly approach to the 
development of safe harbor rules in areas (like the nonpublic offering exemption under 
the ‘33 Act) of considerable statutory ambiguity.  The flexibility that is preserved 
maximizes the effective scope of the Commission’s jurisdiction and limits the 
opportunity for post hoc criticism based on the perception that, as a result of the 
particular line that it drew, the agency failed to prevent, if not encouraged, some activity 
that turned out to be socially harmful. 
Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC as a Bureaucracy: Public Choice, Institutional Rhetoric, and the 
Process of Policy Formulation, 47 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 527, 531 (1990). 
 230. Id. at 530. 
 231. Id. at 530-31. 
 232. SanDisk Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2006 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 621, at *3-4 (Sept. 21, 
2006). 
 233. EIG Mutual Holding Company, SEC No-Action Letter, 2006 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 652, at 
*5 (Oct. 25, 2006). 
 234. 17 C.F.R. § 202.1(d) (2006) (providing that “opinions expressed by members of the staff 
do not constitute an official expression of the Commission’s views”). 
 235. If the Commission were bound by informal staff views, the SEC staff’s advisory service 
to the public would shrink.  See Nagy, Judicial Reliance, supra note 225, at 936. 
 236. According to the separate statement of former SEC commissioner Fleischman in Release 
No. 28990, “others claiming to be similarly situated can’t be allowed to reason from the [no-action] 
letter to derive general propositions on which the addressee itself could not rely.” SEC Exchange 
Act Release No. 28990, 1991 SEC LEXIS 409, at *9 (March 20, 1991). 
 237. See generally Campbell, Rule 145, supra note 11. 
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circle.” 
The SEC should always keep in mind that interpretive releases are 
better than no-action letters to clarify ambiguous statutory languages in 
the federal securities laws, rules and regulations.238  The SEC’s ad hoc 
approach to Rule 145 transactions through no-action letters is 
comparable to a cruise without a guiding light.  The Commission must 
give up its no-action letter preference and amend Rule 145 so that the 
rule may serve as a guiding light for securities market participants and 
their legal counsel planning a Rule 145 transaction.  The amendment to 
Rule 145 should be consistent with the legislative purposes and general 
rules of the 1933 Act.239 
Rule 145(a) rightly answers the legislative purpose of the 1933 Act 
by extending the “sale” concept to certain business combination 
transactions, thereby triggering Section 5’s registration and prospectus 
requirements.  However, Rule 145(a) draws too dogmatic a line between 
“sale” and “no-sale.”240  Moreover, it fails to provide a clear standard for 
 
 238. It is clear that the Commission’s general position stated in an interpretive release gives 
more certainty and predictability to financial market players than the SEC staff’s no-action position 
on a particular transaction. Also, third party reliance is better legally protected on an authorized 
interpretive release than on a no-action letter. See Richard H. Rowe, Reliance on SEC Staff “No 
Action” Letters-A Shield or a Sword?, in OPINIONS IN SEC TRANSACTIONS 681-95 (1995), available 
at WESTLAW, 896 PLI/Corp 667. 
 239. The Senate Report on the Securities Act of 1933 provides that “[t]he purpose of this bill is 
to protect the investing public and honest business.” SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, 
REGULATION OF SECURITIES, S. REP. NO. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933), cited in United States v. 
Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 775 (1979). 
Even though courts hold slightly different views, all courts have the same opinion that “investor 
protection” is one of important purposes of the 1933 Act. Compare United States v. Naftalin, 441 
U.S. 768, 775 (1979) (holding that “neither [the Supreme Court] nor Congress has ever suggested 
that investor protection was the sole purpose of the Securities Act”), with A.C. Frost & Co. v. Coeur 
D’Alene Mines Corp., 312 U.S. 38, 40 (1941) (holding that investor protection is the “essential 
purpose” of the 1933 Act), and Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. 
denied, 361 U.S. 896 (1959) (holding that “[t]he principal and essential purpose of the 1933 Act is 
to protect investors”). 
As the Supreme Court stated in Pinter v. Dahl, the purpose of investor protection under the 1933 
Act is achieved “by requiring publication of material information thought necessary to allow [the 
investors] to make informed investment decisions . . . .” 486 U.S. 622, 638 (1988). 
 240. See Campbell, Rule 145, supra note 11, at 339 (arguing that “Rule 145 also has been 
plagued by the breakdown of the categories delineated in section (a) of the Rule”). Cf. Heyman, 
Implications, supra note 32, at 792. 
Does the rule imply that any transaction not within its terms is not a sale?  Is it possible 
that some transactions which, reading the language of the Rule literally, are within its 
terms are also not sales? Although speculative opinions of the type which will follow are 
possible, a definitive answer to this question must await future Commission 
interpretation of Rule 145. It is hoped that such interpretations will prove fully consistent 
with the policies underlying the Rule. 
Id. 
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the determination of whether a “sale” has occurred.  Consequently, the 
SEC’s interpretations and applications of Rule 145(a) are inconsistent 
and sometimes go beyond the congressional intent of the 1933 Act. 
In amending Rule 145(a), the SEC should expressly stipulate the 
words “material change in security holders’ rights” as a standard for the 
determination of whether a “sale” is involved.241  The “material change” 
standard also leaves a question: what is a “material change” in 
connection with a certain recapitalization or business combination?242  
The SEC can answer this question through interpretive releases 
formalizing plenty of its staff interpretations of Rule 145.  The language 
“material change” in the text of Rule 145 serves as a legal basis to 
prevent the SEC’s ad hoc approach, where the SEC’s policy 
consideration takes precedence over investor protection and market 
integrity in the definition of the term “sale.” 
The “presumptive underwriter” under Rule 145(c) has lost its 
historical necessity since the adoption of the “sale” theory.  The 
“underwriter” status, imposed on Rule 145 securities holders under Rule 
145(c), unreasonably increases compliance costs and discounts the price 
of securities due to the lack of liquidity.  Resale restrictions are more 
burdensome to small business issuers.  Unless Congress provides new 
legislative ground for Rule 145 underwriters, Rule 145(c) and (d) must 
be repealed and the general resale provisions of the 1933 Act must be 
applied to the resale of Rule 145 securities.  It is regrettable that the SEC 
has not adopted the proposed amendment to Rule 145 in the Release No. 
33-7391243 yet.244 
 
 241. “Rule 145(a) should state that a reclassification, merger, consolidation or transfer of assets 
involves a sale of securities to voting shareholders who receive stock in the transaction only if the 
transaction results in a material change in the corporation or in shareholders’ rights.”  Campbell, 
Rule 145, supra note 11, at 340. 
 242. See supra Part IV.D. 
 243. “The presumptive underwriter and resale provisions of Rule 145(c) and (d) are . . . 
proposed to be eliminated.”  SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-7391, supra note 1934, at 31. 
 244. Most securities market participants seem to welcome the proposed revision of Rule 145. 
A securities company commented on the proposal as follows: 
We support the Commission’s proposal in the Release to eliminate the presumptive 
underwriter doctrine in Rule 145(c) and (d). We do not believe that there is sufficient 
justification for presuming that holders of securities received in a registered transaction 
covered by Rule 145 (a “Rule 145 transaction”) that are not affiliates of the issuer of 
those securities are underwriters for purposes of the Securities Act. If Rule 145(c) and 
(d) are eliminated, holders of securities received in a Rule 145 transaction that are not 
affiliates of the issuer of those securities would be free to sell those securities in the open 
market. 
Comments of Robin Roger, Morgan Stanley & Co. Incorporated, New York, May 23, 1997, 
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s7797/roger1.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2006).  See 
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The above-mentioned amendment to Rule 145 will provide greater 
clarity and predictability in the registration and resales of Rule 145 
securities.  Consequently, it will save a lot of billable hours and 
administrative resources.  The societal value of a business combination 
under Rule 145 lies in efficient resource allocation.  In this sense, this 
author strongly believes that the amendment to Rule 145 and the SEC’s 
clear and predictable interpretation of Rule 145 will encourage efficient 
recapitalizations and reorganizations by reducing unnecessary regulatory 
costs. 
 
also Comments of Daniel Dunson, Charles F. Rechlin, Mary Moynihan, and David Rockwell, 
Sullivan & Cromwell, New York, April 29, 1997 (TEXT REVISED 5-9-97), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s7797/dunson1.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2006); Comments of 
William J. Schnoor, Jr., of Testa, Hurwitz & Thibeault, LLP, Boston, Mass., on behalf of the 
National Venture Capital Association, April 28, 1997, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s7797/schnoor1.txt (last visited Oct. 25, 2006). 
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